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FPJSFAGB
This study was originally to have examined only the
actual negotiations for the proposed Anglo-German loan, to Por
tugal in I898 #

In order to delve into this historical prob

lem, however, it became necessary to set the stage for the
actual narrative.

In this case the stag® has become almost

a panoramic view of th© diplomacy of the late nineteenth cen
tury.

It is difficult to

issue of this period from

separate any European diplomatic
the Iron Chancellor of

Germany,

Otto von Bismarck, and since this m s also a period of bur
geoning colonies, the author has briefly examined both Bis
marck! an diplomacy and colonial expansion in Africa.

The

author hopes his first two chapters have not become overly
extended in his attempt to portray th© diplomatic and colonial
problems which formed the basis of misunderstanding and dis
trust in the final negotiations.
In order to avoid possible confusion the author would
like to point out several stylistic adaptations.

Following

accepted procedure th© author has insert©! an nen into umlauted German words.

He has also abbreviated th© headings on

diplomatic exchanges to just th® surname of th© correspondent.
Further Identification is

provided either within

in the Preference Index in

Appendix B.
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the textor

AcmoyfmmnimfB
fh# author wishes to express his sincere appreciation
to th© members of th© faculty of th© Department of History,
Uni verslly of Omaha* for the words of criticism and advice
given him while he served as Intern in th# Department*

Spe

cial thanks are due to Drs* Raymond A. Smith, Jr. and Georg#
A# Bothrock, Jr., under whom he served in the above position.
He is particularly indebted to Mr* David Adams for his as
sistance with the maps to

his

advisor, Dr* A. Stanley

Trickett, for his patience, advice, criticism, and faithful
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neophyte historian.
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CHAPTER

I

THE 3ISMAHCKIAK ERA f 1870-1890
The last four decades of the nineteenth century brought
an abrupt shift of European interest from the continent to
other areas of the world*

Adventurers explored unknown areas

of Africa and the South Seas.

Continental rivals often

worked side by side in colonial areas*

The three largest

powers, Germanyf France, and Great Britain claimed territory
and concessions in southeast Asia and Africa*

The exploration

and division of the latter provides an excellent example of
continental rivalry in colonial areas in the late nineteenth
century*
Africa had been a lfdark continent*1 prior to th© expedi
tions of discovery of th©

mid-nineteenth century*

While there

were European settlements in Africa before this time, most
were along the coasts.

Rarely did the claimant attempt to

establish territorial limitations; even more infrequently were
settlements incorporated into integral colonies*
Portugal was the first European power in modern times
to settle African territory south of the Sahara.

As early as

l¥fl she had established a slave trade in posts north of the
equator, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century Por
tuguese settlements existed on both the east and west coasts

2

of southern Africa*

Angola, the western settlement, soon

emerged as the more important, due to the thriving slave trade
with the Hew World*^
the leading European colonial power was Great Britain,
a country which had established colonies or interests in North
America, Asia, Australia, and Africa.

Ih the latter region, as

in the others, Great Britain originally had entered upon a
colonial policy for economic advantage.

Many felt that It

would be possible to realise a favorable balance of trade*
In 1652 the Dutch established the first European settlement
on the south African cape; the British soon followed suit*

A

strong rivalry developed between the two powers over the ex
cellent harbor facilities at the Gape*

In 1781 a British

squadron made an unsuccessful attempt to seise the Dutch set
tlement; a later effort proved more rewarding, however, and
the British established control in 1795*

After briefly re

verting to the Dutch after the Peace of Amiens in 1802, the
territory became permanently British in 1806*'~'

From this

date, British interests In Africa continued tc expand, although
at times at a very slow rata*
Dissatisfaction with British rule and particularly with
^ James Duffy, Portuguese Afy,lea, (Cambridge 1 Harvard
University Press, 19W), P* W *
Hereafter cited as Duffy,
.Portuguese} Africa. The 'slave trade comprised about eighty
per cent of the total exports of Angola* Ibid*
P
James A* Williamson, £ Bfoort Hi,story o.fr British Ex
pansion* 2M M o m Smnir^ M
ComgiomSlth. vol. 11 (hth
ed*; Londons Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1958), pp. 116-120.
Hereafter cited as Williamson, British Expansion.

the slavery abolition settlement of 1833 and I83V caused
many of the Dutch, or Boers, to move to what later became
the Transvaal, Natal, and the Orange Free State in the Af
rican. interior.

Gradually, however, Britain extended her

control to areas north of the Cape Colony and there again
arose difficulties between the two peoples*

Finally, in

18-13, Hatal was declared a British colony, and the Trans
vaal and the Orange Free State were annexed.

The latter

two regions were allowed independence as long as they out
lawed slavery.^
The French, too, had established claims in Africa prior
to the expansionistic explosion of the latter half of the
nineteenth century, although these claims were north of the
Sahara*

Charles X, in an attempt to divert public attention

from domestic problems to foreign glory, sent an expedition
to Algeria in I83O.

The expedition was successful, although

the success did not reach the home scene; the monarch was
forced to abdicate in July, th© same month Algiers fell.
The new government of Louis Philippe faced the difficult
problem of either administaring or disposing of the newly
acquired territory.

The few Frenchmen who desired expansion

were, for the most part, naval officials who saw the strat
egic value of a base on the southern shore of the Mediter
ranean.

Several years' passed before the government decided

to expand from the initial base at Algiers;

it was not

3 Williamson, British teaoslon. II, 121-128.

until tlio fall of Constantine in, l8'37* that Trance embarked
on a definite colonial policy in florth Africa#
A map published in 1866 showed large blank spaces over
It
m e n of the unexplored African interior# Less than two
decades earlier, the British missionary and explorer,
David Livingstone, entered southern Africa., on the first of
his important journeys; Richard Irrncis Burton and John Han
ning Speke entered the depths of central Africa in the late
ie?o*s#
Livingstone, Burton, Speke, Samuel Raker, who explored
the Upper Rile, and others published fascinating, if not
always accurate, accounts of thoir encounters with 51darkest
*>
A f r i c a # T h e s e treatises not only whetted lie Interest of
the 3uropear>f, but they also dispelled a number of fears and
mis eone options about the continent*^
J. 9 Simmons,
“The Opening of
Tropical Africa,
1870-1835,
'f'tJt
?- ..
1- *
~TT

V .

■?

_

.

J .n

itloiv
varsity Press, 1959)5 P* 65#

«r>. . J»

*

m

•**<■ •** *«—

*****

Hereafter cited as Cambridge.

S s i M s h Im i m *

The deluge of publications began with Livingstone1s
Simmlzi
in Santii A O & a a (1857).
Soon after this fallowed Burton’s L^kc Roglmg.^ of Central
Africa (1860)^Jpeke’s ^ o f ,
CIS63;,
Grant’s A Walk Asr.aga __
>3 ), Grant
on*s S 14 .Hllq A"xia (105+), Aivta-rstsne

aa&ga

a£. a& i& aM lSA aa 1a la a U a lia n .,m a i£& 'SvXhntsr.:

(18o5)> and Balter’s inhere «*yaasa (1866).

Geographers and cartographers sot forth many theories
concerning the source of the Hile^ and it yms with, this
oroblem that many explorers of this period concerned them
selves# for an Interesting recent account of the expiora11 on
of the Upper Hilo, see Alan Uoorahead %
Ullc (How
York* Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), 23!UdB*

5
Geographical societies, missionary societies, and
other private organisations financed most of the expeciitions to the African Interior*

As Europeans gained more in

formation about the geography and. the potential wealth of
the land, speculators formed organizations to promote the
exploration and to spread European religion, culture, and
civilisation to the f,newt1 continent.
The expeditions also became symbolic of a new national
pride.

Sir Charles Dilke soon became a leading spokesman

of the rising imperial sentiment in Great Britain, a sen
timent which also was apparent in other countries.

Dilke,

in his Greater Britain (1868), pointed out to his fellow ~
Englishmen that wSaxondom will rise triumphant from the
*7

doubtful struggle** with the ♦‘cheaper” races.r

Imperialism

became a factor in governmental policy as well as private
enterprise, and it was around this problem that a great cart
of European diplomacy revolved in the last few decades of
the nineteenth century.
Great Britain long had followed a twofold policy to
ward Europe-— non-involvement so long as th© balance of power
was not endangered and, after l8l5, the maintenance of the
neutrality of the low countries.

Th© French Revolution

forced Britain to actively Intervene in order to protect
her interests, but Castlereagh restored non-involvement as soon as
it was expedient.

It was not until the Crimean War that

7 Charles Wentworth Dilke, Greater Britain: 4 Record
of Travel in Engl 1sh-Speakin#_ffiun.tries (oth ed.; Londons
Macmillan and Co., 1890J, P*

6

Britain again entered into a coalition with European coun
tries*

This time her purpose was to maintain her Influence

in the Stralts~a thorny problem for many years— and to pre
vent Russia from gaining entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.
In the same year that M i k e published greater Britain,
the liberal* William S. Gladstone, formed his first ministry!
the new Prime Minister vowed to continue a policy of non
expansion in the face of the rising interest in Africa*

Glad

stone realized that he would face possible conflicts with
other countries if he entered Africa, and the pending “AlabamaH
claims dispute further convinced him of the wisdom of noninvolvoment.

Hi 1869, in a lengthy letter to the queen*s

private secretary, the Prime Hintstor condemned the cost of
British participation in the- continental wars.

Although he

did not absolutely oppose intervention, Gladstone did not
want Britain to become entangled in continental alliances.
She should not
encourage the weak by giving expectations of aid
to resist the strong, but should rather seek. to„
deter the strong by firm but moderate language.**
While Gladstone in this instance was summarising what he
thought to be the policy of his foreign minister, Lord
Clarendon, they were words to which he wholeheartedly
ascribed.
^ “Gladstone to Grey," in John Morley, Thq Life. o,
f
William Swart Gladstone, vol. II (New York* The Macmillan
Company, 1903)t PP* 317-318. Hereafter cited as Morley,

7
After the death of Clarendon In June, 1870, Lord Gran
ville received the seals of the Foreign Office;

he managed

England1s foreign affairs during the brief Franco-Prussiea
War*

When the Hohenzollern candidacy threatened the peace

of Europe, Gladstone surprisingly declared, his sympathy for
the French position*

As French demands became more strong,

and both the French and the Prussian, governments moved toward
the Impending conflict, It became apparent that there was lit
tle Great Britain could do to forestall hostilities.^
Although Britain had declared her neutrality, she re
fused to imoose restrletions on munitions to th© belligerents.
Since France had the vessels to secure the weapons, and Ger
many did not, the British position brought sharp protest
from the Prussian chief minister, Otto von Bismarck,

The war

quickly ended, but the British action, coupled with Bismarck’s
inherent distrust of the Liberal “Professor*,'4''brought an es
trangement between the old

islandkingdom and the growing

continental newer.

end of the war th© British Cabinet

At the

refused to protest the Prussian seizure of Alsace-Lorraine,
as Gladstone had suggested; but this action failed to restore
Prussian confidence in Great Britain, although it did allevlGreat Britain had 20,000 men available for service in
the event of war. Paul Knaplund, Gladstone1s Foreign Policy
{Hew Xork* Harper and Brothers Publishers, 193?X, ppV W - W T
^ Raymond James Son tag, G ermanv
Gnr lands B&ckgr otxnft
of Conflict, l8M3~l89lf (Hew forks D. AoDleton-0e.ii.turv Comoanv,
k i S $ : TteFeafter cited as Sentag, Sorsanv a M
En-land. Bismarck derisively referred to Gladstone as the
“Professortf*

8
ate the situation to a certain extent
The Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 ended the short war between France and Prussia and brought a dramatic shift of
political strength from, western to central Europe.

The

sweeping continental changes were largely the result of
Bismarck, who became the Imperial Chancellor of the new Gor
man Empire*

From th© bog Inning of the Second Reich on <Jar:n—

ary 18* 1871, until he was dismissed by William II in 1890,
Bismarck ruled Germany with a strong hand.

Although the

Kaiser had appointed his chancellor and conceivably could re
move him when he wanted, B1 snrrckts strong will, fast-flowing
tears, and frequent threats .1 resignation, ©roved more than
a match for the aged William I.
The period from 1871 to 1890, however, was more than an
era of Bismarck in Germany? It was an era of Bismarck In
Europe.

The man who had formed a new Empire through a policy

of ^blood and iron*1 Inspired fear and respect in other rulers.
He established an intricate alliance system to isolate France?
this, felt Bismarck, would effectively maintain the peace in
.12
Europe.'
The Hrelkalserband was an agreement among the em
perors of Austria, Russia, and Germany? by this understanding
Bismarck hoped to maintain the status quo and preserve the
11 Korley, Sladstoae. II, &7-3M and E. W. Seton-Watson,
;ain ia BuropeT l7B^19I^« 4 Survey o£ Foreign Policy (Cambridge* At the University Press,19©5), p* **99* Hereafter
cited as Seton-Watson, Briialp In Europe.
^ Bee particularly William L. Banger, Earpaean Alliance
Alignments. 1871-1890 (Hew Yorks Alfred A. Knopi- 19507,
passim. Hereafter cited as banger, Alliances a,
pd Alignments

9
peace.

Bismarck later attempted to forestall any possible

Austro-Hussian hostilities by concluding unilateral agreemont s w th ooili govoriiments.

The Triole Alliance, signed a

decade later (1382), further demonstrated Bismarck1s- astute
diplomatic maneuvers and his ability to bring apparent unity
among former enemies.

The Reich had reached agreements or

understandings with all the major

-ewers of Europe with the

exception of France and Great Britain*

'France could be ren

dered poverless through a close-knit alliance system, but the
knot could bo draim even tighter if the Chancellor could secure
the support of Franco’s last possible ally— Great Britain.
He realised, however, that it would be quite difficult to
secure an agreement with any British government and that it
would be almost impossible to gain the support of the Liberal
Prime Minister, William Gladstone.
The British liberal leader faced an uphill battle in his bid
for re-election in 1-37**-•

The conservative opposition lea by

Benjamin Disraeli took advantage of the rising Imperial sen
timent created by Sir Charles Dilke and others and accused the
Prime Minister of having sacrificed British prestige abroad.
In a speech at Manchester In April, 1872, and amplified in his
famous Crystal Palace speech later that 2/ear, Disraeli not
only pleaded for better working conditions within the country,
but he also challenged, the stand of th© Liberal Party on colonial
and Imperial issues^wo years later Disraeli became Prime
Minister; his stand on colonial issues had won

him a number

of supporters and probably had assured his election.

10
In addition to the domestie attacks, Gladstone also faced
the vilification of the German Chancellor*

R* J* Sontag comes

to the surprising conclusion that Bismarck*s condemnation of
the flProfessor** awakened Great Britain to th© ^realization that
their interests would boat be served by conciliating a rising
state which had the power to help or hurt England*

Bis**

merck perhaps also attacked the British .Liberal policies in
an attempt to reduce the strength of the German liberals, lad
by the Crown Prince*

lie matter what the reason, tie Chancel

lor desired the election of the Conservative candidate, and
when Disraeli became Prime Minister, prospects for closer
Anglo^German ties' appeared bright*
Disraeli embarked upon a policy of renewed activity In
colonial affairs when he assumed power in l87*n

A year after

he entered office Disraeli purchased the Khedive of Egypt13
1h*
shares™ in the Suez Canal Company— an action which Gladstone
had earlier rejected*

Although Disraeli*s purchase of canal

stock did not bring political control of the canal, it did
cause Britain*s voice to be heard In the management of the
new route*

The new royal title,

rress of India, given, to

Queen Tictorla. in 18?6 after a vigorous and embarrassing
sontag, garmapy and 'England* p* 89*
•j
i+ 176,602 out of a total of ^00,000 shares. The British
investment later brought favorable public reaction for inter
vention. to protect British interests in the Canal* A# 1* P.
Taylor, The Struggle, fay, Mastery In £jurone» 1.8k8-1.91-9 in fh9
■Oxford History of Modern Bur ope % Alan'Bullock, @d* (Oxford I
At the Clarendon Press, 19ytT” P* 23?ru Hereafter cited as
Taylor, Struggle for

11
struggle with the liberals, symbolised the renewed interest
in colonial activity.
It was more than political prestige, however,. whrich
motiveted Disraelifs desire for expansion.

Foreign trade,

long important to tho British economy, became increasingly
vital with the rapid rise of izidustrialiaation in tho nine
teenth century.

As ether notions became industrialised, the

"British share of the world market declined.'

Disraeli and

other British leaders sought to accelerate the economy and
found the renewed Internet in colonies as a possible solution.
The opening of the Suer Canal had brought an increase in
trade with the Far Fast, and Disraeli took steps to keep the
new route open.

Investors were encouraged by the bold, ven

ture of Disraeli, and financial intercuts began to seel: out
markets and materials' in the other newly opened territories.
At the same time the British Government began its policy
of expansion. Imperial Germany, led by Bismarck, retreated
from the prospect of acquiring territory outside continental
Burope.

Many Gormans had earlier urged active colonisation.

Frederick List held that colonies would provide an outlet for
surplus populati on,and Wilhelm Hoscher emphasised that 11Germany
15 William Ashworth, M

U za-1232 in
ad.

m

l£2S2li£

. gaaaga&s Iftg fcaz a£ 3agfep»

Si England*

- * s . Ashton,

(London.: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 19b0), pp. 133-139*

•” Despite the new governmental attitude British exports
to Africa, Burope, and South America remained static or de
clined In the period 1879 to 1889 relative to other countries*
Exports to other areas failed to compensate for the relative
decline of Great Brita in*
» P* 3.J+,3»

la
must lose no time if the last suitable territories are not
c seised by other and more resolute n
Germans formed associations for the ourposo of promoting
colonisation, but they seldom called for the establishment
.of political sovereignty over the now areas,

Settlors re

turned to Gorman lands and spoke of the valuable territory in
Africa| explorers called for the establishment of control
1P
over tho lands they had cha??ted.
Despite the sympathy for colonial activity in a number
of the German states Before 1871, Bismarck opposed a policy
of expansion*

The Chancellor felt that Germany* s energies

should be concentrated on the continent; imperial activity
could be a potential source of hostilities;
the attempt to establish colonies in territories
'Whose suzerainty is claimed by other States,
whether rightly or vr'v ly, might lead to mani
fold and undesirable disputes**9
Colonies would be detrimental, maintained Bismarck, because
•’they could only be defended by powerful fleets, and Ger
many1s geographical position did. not necessitate her developmerit into a first-class maritime Power*11

Military leaders

17
■
“
**"*f
, .TM Q m r n m
and the Up,
Ail
: tv Movemapt* vol* II (Hew fork; The '"mcmilSn Com*
f 5, p , 17? • Hereafter cited as Dawson* Gorman Smvi:
pany, 1919
IB TVl
19

13
opposed extra- terr Itor ial expansion because it would deplete
trie size of tho forces available witMn the country.

.Ad

miral Albrecht von Stosch, the founder of the Imperial llavy,
countered the latter argument by privately suggesting that
since so many Germans were leaving'the country to escape th©
rigorous military service, It would be wise to establish a
place for Germans to settle rather than have them go to th#
United States
The German Chancellor also suggested that colonial activ
ity was a place whore Goeat Britain and Prance could concen
trate their resources,

A Trench colonial policy could divert

the Third Bspnblic from action on behalf of Alsace-Lorraine,
particularly if Germany should support French claims*

Ger

man eonsetit!on with Great Britain could not bring advantages
to the former, but it could bring a. return of Britain to con
tinental affairs and perhaps , worst of all, an Anglo-French
alliance against the Belch,

If both Great Britain aad Franc#

would enter Africa, there would arise territorial disrates,
po
and Britain, seeking colonial support, would turn to Germany.~
Bismarck* s words about colonial rivalries soon proved pro
phetic, as BtiP-opean nations began to vie with each other over
control of African territory*
Frederic B. M. Hollyday, BisTOrcfc'a Rival, 4 Political
k%s&K£l 434£2fiM. Z2fl fifeasfifc (Durham*
Blpgraiohy 24 General
Sake Gnlverslty Brass, 19o0j, pp. 120, 123.
21

22 C. Grant Robertson, Bismarck in jfafcsRa 24 &J2. lU&Sr
teeath Century. Basil Williams, ed. (London: Constable and
Company, Ltd*, 1913), pp. %l7-kl9.
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African

Association for th© purpose of co-ordinating tho colonial ©IV
forts of the member groups; it also established branches in
the home countries of each of the participating members*

Th©

central or gaxixas.t~on , howov ©r , soon. i.dl under wn© sway* of
the Belgian icing, and the venture failed.

With the demise of

the Association the brief hope of co-operative ventures on a
large scale disa^5o©ai/©ct a.iici Burocean powers began to carve
out colonial empires for themselves in Africa.
Leopold created the Congo Free Boat© under his personal
supervision a year after the .nations had mat in Brussels.
The next year, in 1880, Savorgnan de Brazza* a french adven
turer, lay claim to the region north of the Congo lUver for
his country.

Italy quickly showed her willingness to add

African territory to her peninsular holdings, and Portugal as
serted her claim to much of the western coast south of th®
Congo River.
The Gorman Chancellor, although he had tried to stem
the tide of colonial sentiment, was not able to stop German
private enterprise from extra-territorial ventures.

Mission

ary activity had begun almost thirty years prior to th©
founding of the Bmpire, and German influence expanded from a
tiny nucleus on the west coast of southern Africa as other
settlers moved into th© area from the Fatherland.

Great Britain

had already claimed the best port facilities on tho south*
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western coast at Waifisell (Whale) Bay.

It appeared that a

conflict of interest could develop, although the German en
terprise was strictly a private venture.
During a tribal war in 1880, the Imperial German Govern
ment asked Britain to extend protection to the German citizens
outside Walflsch Bay} Great Britain agreed to protect the
German nationals* but only if they were within British ter
ritory.

In an effort to secure protection for his holdings,

Brans A* Luederitz? a wealthy Bremail merchant, asked the Ger
man Government for assistance.

Bismarck, although It meant

an opening of colonial responsibilities, surprisingly agreed
to this proposal, but only if the settlements were In previ
ously unclaimed territory.^3

This step marked the beginning

of a German imperial policy, although at first it was under
the firm control of the Iron Chancellor*
Bismarck discreetly asked the British Foreign Office
whether England had claims in th© area under consideration}
ten months later the British Government replied to Bismarck1s
query.

Although Her Majesty1s Government claimed only two

places on the west coast,^ It felt that
!,any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a
foreign Power between the southern point of Por
tuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18 and the
frontier of Gape Colony would Infringe their
legitimate rights.
2’ Dawson, Saipan Snrdre. II, 188.
Alllanc.es a M Alignments, p. 292.

See also Banger,

Walflsch Bay and the islands outside the harbor at
Angra Pecuena.
25 Oawson, Sar-flan 2aalm» II» 189.
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Britain thus maintained that wi'fle she did not claim the area,
no one else could either*

Bismarck quickly reacted to this

unilateral British proclamation of a "Honrce Doctrine11 and
formally established a protectorate over the west coast of
Africa, from tho boundary of Gape Colony on the Orange Hover
to the Portuguese territory of Angola*^
The semi-official Koeliiische geitung launched violent
attacks against Gladstone and the British policy.

These as

saults were paralleled by continued German expansion, as tho
Imperial Government added part of Hew Guinea, a few Pacific
islands, Togo, Kamerun, and some territory on the east coast
of Africa*
The Chancellor for years had strongly opposed a colonial
policy for Germany, arid one may wonder why he abandoned his
earlier principles and actively sought additional territo
ries*

lust as Bismarck earlier thought only of Germany when

he refrained from colonisation, he now thought only of im
proving the Belch when he entered the colonial field.

The

Chancellor discerned opportunities which an expansionist
policy offered to his European system of alliances and also
the possibility of gaining greater domestic support for his
programs*

.Pressure groups were active5 romantics desired

expansion; and merchants sought imperial protection, but th©
^ In May, 188**, a month, after Germany had established
claim to the western coast, the Cape Colony Government an
nounced a plan to extend control over the coastal territory
from the Orange River to Walflsch Bay, completely ignoring
the earlier German claims* This move did not improve AngloGerman relations.
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influence* of these groups on Bismarck is questionable.

In

1870 Herbert Bismarck attempted to explain his father1s sud
den entrance into the colonial field by referring to the
English* or liberal, threat!
*f!ihen we started [our] colonial policy, we had
to face a long reign by th© G r o m Prince* during
•which English influence would predominate. In
order to forestall thiS| we had to launch M
colonial policy, which is popular and can pro
duce conflicts'with England at any moment. **£7
In addition to this, a popular colonial policy sight secure
a co-operative Keichstag in the fall elections.

Bismarck

never adopted a colonial policy out of conviction, but merely
used its popularity for his own purposes! #I am against it
[colonial expansion]*1 he maintained, fhnt I allow it to
drive
The European political scene was of far greater influ
ence on Bismarck when he commenced his colonial policy than
were domestic considerations.

Th® amicable Anglo-French

relations of the era of the Franco-Prusaian War had shorn
signs of deteriorating because of Disraeli*s purchase of the
Suez Canal stock and the British occupation of Egypt*

Although

Gladstone said his move into Egypt was only temporary, the
British occupation continued.

England1© recognition of Por

tugal1s claim to the mouth of the Congo in February, 188k,
further strained Anglo-French relations, for France had
p. 293.
r m x m Frelherrn von Eckardstein, Leb.ens-Brlnperup£.;
!&& Pol It Is oho Dertoagr atghef tea van Batse.haffl.srat &. 2- » vol.
I (teipzlg: Verlac Paul List., 1919), pp. 307. Hereafter
cited as Eckardsteln, Erir
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claimed this region several years earlier.
The IT?each revanche feeling had shown signs of weakening*
and Franca-German relations had improved since the war scare
of 1875*

It is possible that Bismarck was seeking to achieve

closer ties between the two countries; Bismarck could mend
Berlin-Paris differences by adopting an anti-British policy
In colonial fields.

Although tensions between Franc© and Ger

many were too strong to allow an alliance, there perhaps could
oq
be an entente.*™' The British reluctance to recognise German
claims in Africa prompted the Chancellor to side with France
at a conference on Egyptian finance, and Great Britain could
see her growing Isolation from continental powers.
While the desire for a Franco-German rapprochement per
haps is plausible* it is necessary to remember that Bismarck
did not wish to alienate England.

It is possible that through

colonial pressure and an apparent pro-French attitude Bis
marck was attempting to foster closer relations with the is
land kingdom; German diplomats often employed such pressure—
usually without success.

The Chancellor realised, that without

the friendship of the British Koyal Navy* he was wasting his
energies on a colonial policy; thus an anti-British endeavor
seams unlikely.

Because of Bismarck1s new colonial activities

29 Taylor, atraagl. f & H Mastery* p p . 286- 302. Taylor
maintains that Bismarck was "playing genuinely for agreement
with Franc©." Ibid.. p. 296. The premier and foreign minis
ter of France* Jules Ferry, had fostered a renewed French,
colonial policy as he entered Tunis, Bado-China* and equa
torial Africa. By working with France against Britain In th©
colonial field* Bismarck could establish a Franco-German
friendship.
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Britain could see the value of Garnan friendship; Germany*s
support of Russia in the Hear 'East or of France in Bgypt
could endanger the British policies abroad*^
Lord Granville, .Gladstone1s foreign Secretary, soon
ended France1s brief period of friendship with Germany when
he disclosed a secret Gorman offer for Britain to take Egypt*
Onea again a ravagehe policy asserted itself in Franc© against
the "treacherous German11, and Bismarck openly turned to the
"Profossor*n

By March, 188?, Gladstone and Bismarck had put

aside their antagonisms, at least oublically, and tentatively
welcomed each other as partners "in the execution of the great
purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind.tf^
The combination of crises over the commencement of Ger
man colonisation, Russian advances Into Afghanistan, the ali
enation of Prance, and particularly the death of General
!fCh:Ln.ese,, Gordon at Khartoum, brought an end to the Glad
stone ministry, and Lord Salisbury assumed power in June,
1885.

The new prime minister felt the situation could be

rectified only by closer co-operation with Germany.

Bis

marck also sought closer ties with Great Britain, for the
reappearance of the Eastern Question threatened to end the
Dr aikais orbund* renewed only two years earlier.

Perhaps

the Chancellor also feared possible isolation*
Having demonstrated the value of German, friendship,
3° Son tag, Ge^ p p y and England* pp. 19]+~196.
^

Ibid,., p.

201*

The words are Gladstone^.
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Bismarck abandoned bis colonial policy*

He felt he had all

the colonies he wanted and 1already nor a • * . than Germany
could digest#f3^

The Chancellor openly sought closer ties

Kith the new British Prime Minister and maintained that 11the
friendship of Salisbury is worth more to me

feismarckj than

twenty swampy African eoloniesJ^S
Although Bismarck himself again had turned toward Bugland,, the German press still uttered words of warning*

The

lioolnlsche Beltuns. on June 22, 188?, stated that Britain had
to recognise that Germany still had colonial aspirations:
•If Bag land is now prepared to accept Germany as a competitor,
friendship is possible and desirable, but it must be on the
now hasis**^
As colonial expansion continued, the African territorial
rivalries became more bitter.

Despite Anglo-German friend

ship on the official level, a strong territorial rivalry
developed in southeastern Africa.

Germany had entered this

region in October, 188**, when Dr* Gerhard Hohlfs was appointed
consul in Zanzibar.

The Imperial Government immediately gave

assurances to Great Britain that it would not annex additional
African territory.

At the sane time Karl Peters, who had bean

32 From a summary of a memorandum by Sir Philip Currie
concerning his conversations with .elsmo rck, September 2-8 to
&£
:or cited as Cecil, Salisbury*
33 Bekartstein, Brinnerunran* !, 307*
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concerted to the colonial gospel while visiting Sngland, es
tablished a colonial propaganda organization, The Society for
German Colonisation.
to Africa.

Peters assembled an expedition and vent

Again the German Government denied any plan to

secure additional territory.

iJhile in the interior in late

Peters, acting on his own initiative, signed treaties
with native chieftains and presented his Government with over

60,000 square miles of territory. 3?
Further difficulties arose when the British Bast Africa
Association entered the area In 1836 and attempted to secure
territory between the African lakes and the east coast.

Since

Peters* claims wore somewhat vague, the two companies soon
were involved in border disputes.

Although a XrO&don-Berliu

conference (November, 1836) settled this problem in a peaceful
maimer, new expeditions by Peters again threatened the peace
in Africa*^
Bismarck continued to press for an Anglo-Germany alli
ance, but in every instance he was rebuffed by Salisbury.
During the close Franco-Eussian co-operation in the Egyptian
question in 1887,

however, Great Britain moved closer to

the Triple Alliance, and rumors that England and Germany had
signed an alliance circulated through the continental Foreign
Offices.

Salisbury denied them all*38

35 Dawson, .German SiSifli# XI> 215-316.
36 p. h» Hlnsley, "International Rivalry, 1885-1895,"
Cambridge British M a i m , HI, 266-267.
37 Ibid.. Ill, 25^— 260.
3® Harold Temperley and T.illian M. Penson, Foundations

In the fall of 1889 Bismarck asked Great Britain for a
further settlement of African colonial problems•

Salisbury

readily agreed to this proposal, since Earl Peters had left
on another expedition into Africa.

Many felt the

Peters*

expedition into the Uganda region would threaten the British
position in the Sudan and in Egypt.3^

The too powers, however,

were unable to reach an immediate agreement, as governmental
changes in Germany brought the proceedings to a standstill.
The death of William I in 1888 strikingly affected the
diplomacy of the late nineteenth century.

Bismarck had

exercised great control over tho aged Kaiser, but there had
long been poor relations between the Chancellor and the new
Kaiser, Frederick III.

William1s son, however, wan incurably

striken with throat cancer when ho came to the throne, and
consequently, the liberal forces, so long feared, were de
prived of their hope for political ascendency after only
of British Paraiita BalLgz from R i U 0222
u/.7g/
)^
_______
62#
(1292)
(Cambri;l2Gs At the University Uress, 1' __
Hereafter cited as Temper ley. British gorflijm Bailey. For
a full discussion of England’s relationship with the Irtwie
Alliance see Joseph V. Fuller, BismarcK*s M S & W SZ S& .Sts
Zenith (Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1922).
There persisted throughout the nineteenth century
the theory that the country which controlled the Kile’s
sources could control Egypt merely by damming off the river*
Of greater significance, of course, was the fact that, while
the British navy and military effectively controlled tower
Egypt, Upper Egypt would still be open to opposing forces
aovin? north. See T.->ylor, jSfcCH&Us £2E
P. 329n.
D. B. 01H a r d maintains that this threat was negligablo* Sea
“Salisbury*s African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890,11
Si® SasIAgli HjatQ£lcaI S 2 & S H
(October 19&B), aaasto.
Hereafter cited as Gil lard, “Salioaury and Heligoland.ft
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ninety-nine days*

When William II came to power, the oppor

tunity for closer relations with England apparently had vaniohed; although the new Kaiser was the grandson of the English
queen, he had often offended the British people by his brutish
This, in addition to the hostility shown by many of
*j.0
the German papers,
seemed to eliminate any hope for an
manners#

Anglo-German agreement*

from the beginning of his reign

William apparently had desired closer ties with England, but
he was viewed with suspicion even by his grandmothers
As regards the political relations of the two
governments [Germany and EnglandJ, the Queen
quite agrees that it should not be affected (if
Possible) by these miserable personal quarrels,
but the Quean much faar.fi that with such a hot
headed, conceited and wong-headed young man,
devoid of all feelings LJtfllXiam JIj> that may
at ANY moment become impossible*^
The now Kaiser*s military advisers began to urge a war
against Russia, and Russo-German relations began to deteri
orate almost from the time Williaa assumed control*

Bismarck

strongly opposed William*5 alienation of Russia, but great as
were the tensions over foreign policy, it was a domestic is
sue which finally brought the fall of the Iron. Chancellor
hj)

One reason was a thorough distrust of English doctors*
One had officiated at the birth of William II, who had a crip
pled arm. Another had opposed an early operation on Frederick
111*3 throat, against the advice of the Gorman doctors, because
'the growth was non-malignant. See P. B# Benson, Tjbfi liaise,r
g.pd English Relations (New York: Longmans, Green and Company,
193^77 p7 p7* Her ©ax ter cited as Benson, Kaiser a.nd Bagilsfo.
Ssla&L
^ The Letters o£ Queen Victoria* ed. George Earle Buckle,
3rd scries, vol. I (London: jHmKurray, 1932), W l . Hereafter
cited as £. 7*

1

2*fr
and concentrated effective power in the hands of the ,fhotheaded*1 Kaiser#

After a stormy scene on March Si* 1890*

William received his Chancellorfs resignation#

An era in

German history had ended*
Bismarck almost single-handedly had formed the new em
pire#

He had also shaped a hew Europe and had made Berlin

the diplomatic capital of the continent#

The question was

raised when Bismarck was released: would his successor* Count
George Leo von Caprivi, be able to continue the brilliant
diplomacy begun by the architect of the German Empire?

CHAPTER II
MGLO-GH£MAH HE LAI IOKS, 1890-1896
Count Leo Caprivi and William II maintained that the
new government would follow the same course as Bismarck In
foreign affairs.

Lord Salisbury, however, felt that the

change of chancellors would have great repercussions on the
European scene.

The British minister deplored the Kaiser*s

action in dismissing Bismarck because he realized that he
would now have to deal with the young ruler*

Salisbury

thought the office of Chancellor would'have much less power
than it formerly had.

Although he believed William to be sin

cere in his statement that German policy would not change,
the' Prime Minister asked, **Bven If he [willlam] thinks thus
today, what guarantee have we that he will not change his
-i
mind overnIght?,,
Salisbury was correct in his assumption that the new
chancellor would wield less power than Bismarck*

“Caprivi

* * * knew nothing of foreign affairs,H maintains A. J* ?.
Taylor, “Marschall, the new secretary of state, not much
more.1*2

As a result the Foreign Office came more and more

n

Tsmpsrley, British gar.etgn Bal-laz. p. W 5.
2 Taylor, Struggle for Mastery* p. 3-53.
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under the control of Friedrich von Holstein* a permanent of
ficial in the office, and the Kaiser, vho chose to follow a
more erratic course on. a no mb or of occasions.
Several months after he assumed power, Caprivi announced
the conclusion of an important colonial agreement in which
Germany had agreed to cede all claims to concessions in Zan
zibar and on the island of Pemba to Britain; the latter would
give up the !iorth Sea island of Heligoland*

Germany also ap

proved a northern border for her colony in eastern Africa;
this excluded the Reich from Uganda and the sources of the
Salisbury agreed to oersua&e the Sultan of Zanzibar to

Wile*

sell his coastal claims in East Africa to Germany, thus giving
Germany the control of the coast as well as the hinterland*
An old Arab proverb maintained that, *If yon play on the
flute at Zanzibar, everybody as far as the lakes dances;13
both Germany and Great Britain realised the commercial value
of the Island*

Salisbury pointed out the importance of Zan

zibar in 1888:
"We have left Prince Bismarck [a] free hand in
Samoa (and a pretty mess fee has made of it!), but
we can not do so in Zanzibar. The English and
Indian interests are both too strong*"
The Iron Chancellor, when In office, had often utilized the
3 Smile de Groot, "Great Britain and Germany In Zanzibarf
Consul Holmwood1s Papers, 1886-1887," Tfe^. Journal of Ho,darn
Hifltarg XOT (dune 1953), 121. Hereafter cited as Groot,
"Zanzibar".
** Cecil, Salisbury* T7, 23^23? and Temper ley, British
f m i l m

J M M & 9

p*

^ 3 *
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German interests in Zanzibar to secure concessions elsewheref?
Caprivi had given up this lever.

Bismarck was strongly

critical of the "Heligoland Agreement!f, as he was with most
of the policies of his successor, and Tainted that if he were
still Chancellor, England herself may h a w given up Zanzibar:
Free trade with that one great market on the
Bast .African coast was the bridge for our traf
fic with the mainland* . . • That the possession
of this bridge would at some future time devolve
upon us * * • I had regarded . . * as probable
enough for such an aim to be regarded • • » as
a possibility worthy of endeavour*
While this is, of course, a gross over1statement, it does in
dicate the value that Bismarck placed on the island which
Caprivi had given up,
Bismarck himself first sought to secure Heligoland for
Germany in iBBh whan he attempted to obtain the island in.
return for Gorman support for the British Egyptian policy.
It appeared in diplomatic conversations several times from
188^ until Bismarck1s fall, but no agreements wore reached.
The British Prime Minister likewise broached the question of
Zanzibar on several occasions, but he was firmly refused.
Despite the close Anglo-German co-operat:! on In the Hear Bast
in the late 1880*s* Salisbury knew he could never come to an
agreement with Bismarck over Zanzibar#

With the change of

chancellors, however, the Prime Minister thought he could
'■* Oroot, "Zanzibar1*, p. 122.
Otto von Bismarck, SSH Skaa&2£& 3 L S i s m s ^ A .H3&3r
hlcorauhy. tro.no. Bernard M a l l (London: Holder and Stoughton,
1920), pp. 286-287.
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reopen the discuss!on3*
Cn Key 13. TO205 Lord Salisbury outlined his proposals
for a coorrleto settlement of African problems to the German
B.inbessador *n London, Po.nl non ilatsfellt.

The Kaiser soon

became quite olated at the prospect of seeiirkig the North
Sea island* and ho came to regard the Toman Last African
7
hoi din on as ba.it for additional concessions*
Oarriri felt
that a. major agreement with Treat Uritain, and/sarticulerly
the acquisition of Heligoland., would, secure greater support
for him at home* .He pointed out that Planarek had earlier
attempted to secure the islsndf he had succeeded*
Despite William1s apparent willingness to sacrifice
Bast Africa (where Germany was losing large amounts of money),
Hatzfaldt managed to secure additional concessions in Africa.
Salisbury agreed that German Bast Africa border the Congo
Free State, since Germany hinted that someday she might want
to pur elms a 'the Congo region*

The English Prime Minister also

agreed to the cession of the flai^Yiglnjtel» a long narrow
strip of territory which Jutted northeast from German SouthI
UGst Africa and connected that territory to the Sambesi Hirer*
The two powers signed the agreement on July I, 1890; this
date aorhaps marks the zenith of Anglo#*German friendship*
^ Dillard, “Salisbury and Heligoland", p. 653*
8 r. H. Kinsley, "'Ititsrnational Rivalry, 1885-1395,"
Cambridge British S=»i££, III, 27S-?.80, Sontag, GorjmaZ s M
liSSUM, PP. 270-273, Set:r.-Hats:;n,
Si Ba£22£t PPC.t'*
, and Dawson, German Bapoire* II, 270-271#
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Although both governments were satisfied with the exchanges
and concessions, the announcement of the provisions stirred
popular resentment in both Great Britain and Germany*

Since

Germany had received a border common with the Congo Free State,
England no longer had the opportunity to construct an "all-red**
route from the Cape Colony to Cairo*

The liberals did not

criticize the concessions, although many objected to strength
ening the British hold over Zanzibar*^

Even the Queen Quietly

stated her objections to certain parts of the Agreements
“That any of my possession should be bartered away causes me
r%
great uneasiness*1* ^ Bor would it be a favorable comment on
British justice to turn people over to an ftunscrupulous des
potic Government like the Germans1?% i thout consulting them
11
first.
The Queen realized, however, that a plebiscite
would be out of the question— other peoples controlled by
England might demand the same privilege*

Salisbury vigorously

defended the agreement by which he had established definite
boundaries for German territories In Africa and thus had
limited the threat of future German expansion into British
lands*^
Although the Kaiser looked with pride upon the agreement
which he had completed within a few months of Bismarck1s
9 Sontag, Germany.
10 Cacil, Salisbury.

England, p. 271.

17, 298.

11 Ibid.
12 See Giilard, "Salisbury and Heligoland," oar,sin.
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German colonial rm^ty bitterly attacked the settlement and
the femsrnmeat for having fives up toe saach he
north £©& island*

dbt^im Hi#

fh# efforts of the British ministers to

defend the treaty in Iceland made the task of the Gorman
gov ■>'m^ont more difficulty the British people were told that
the Islam! was worthless#^

As e result, the ncv ehsimellor

lost* t&xb* * than gained, popular sucpo^t Imosmo of the
Heligoland agreosant*
C&nrivl opposed colonies oven more strongly than his
predecessor#

Bismarck would support a colonial

policy if it

would benefit his European system, hut O&privi disapproved of
all forms of colonial activity*

w The worst thing that e o u M

happen to u$p" he asserted, ftwould be for someone to give us

the whole of Africa#*^ Colonies "

1 not "nly crests aer

enemies fop the Reich, they would be economically improfiitxfelo*^
Tb,& ];

Earl Fetors declared that by the Kaligol

agrccaent, the German Brno 're had sacrificed ft%ro kingdoms *
Witu nmd Uganda, * * .# for a bath tub is. the forth Sea*1^
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Peters1 statements* coupled with Bismarckfs opposition to the
concessions of the Caprivi administration and the popular
feeling for colonial expansion led to the creation of a
colonial society; out of this grew the P&n-Oerman League, an
organisation which gained considerable influence in Germany
IB
during the next decade*
3Tet It was another decision of the Caprivl Government
which proved more important to the European alignment of
powers than the Heligoland agreement.

Bismarck long had at

tempted to protect Germany fro© a possible war in which
Germany would face both Prance and Russia*

Through his in

tricate alliance system, which included the latter, the Iron
Chancellor had eliminated the threat of a two-front war.

When

the Wear Eastern Question threatened to split Austria and
Russia, the wily Chancellor concluded unilateral alliances
with both*

Caprivi allowed the Russo-German Treaty to laps®.

The Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, signed on June 18*
1887, provided that Russia and Germany would maintain neu
trality in the event of war with a third power, unless Russia
attacked Austria or Germany attacked Prance.

With the ad

vent of William to the throne in. 1883 there developed a
definite anti-Russian feeling in Berlin.

Growing interest in

the Ottoman Empire, communications of an economic nature be
tween Prance and Russia, and the Kaiser’s anti-Russian ori-

18 Nichols* Canrivi Br,
a,, pp. 102-103
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entailon contributed to the now relationship* '

The now Caprivi Government had allowed the Reinsurance
Treaty to lapse at the suggestion of Friedrich von Holstein,
who argued that the ambiguity of the treaty would do more
harm than good if the terms ever became known*

At the time

it seemed that little danger could arise from this action;
even Bismarck felt that France and Russia, had sufficient ir
reconcilable differences to forestall any treaty.

An error

in judgment soon became apparent, and the German move initi
ated o realignment of power and sot the stage for a. division
of Europe into two opposing camps*
Embryonic tics between France and Russia had begun as
early as October, 1888, mien France floated a loan of
500,000,000 francs to Russia.

Three months later Russia

placed a large order for rifles in France•®

The IleligoX

Agreement had are’'.sod Paris to the .possibility that England
ot

had joined the Triple Alliance**”

The cession of Heligo

land to the Fetch gave Germany the responsibility of defending
the Forth Sea while paving the way for Great Britain to de
vote all her energies to the Mediterranean.

Open discussion

of Anglo-Italian relations in the British House of Commons

19 Ren® Albrecht-Carrie, A Dioloaatlc His.tox? o£ Eagane
, $&£L SsaSEa&a s£ Vienna (New Yoifct Harper and Brothers,
, p. 205. Hereafter cited as AXbrecht-Carrio, Bi.plgm,
.
TP" <ihoT*v nf jEnroT—
20 Ibid.. p. 206.
2^ P. H. Hinslsy, "International Rivalry, 1885-189? , H
«^jgim:ldg.e Br.xt.lsh Emo xr e % iTl, 270
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pO
led to the disclosure of the first Mediterranean agreement"'
and brought an even greater distrust of British designs in
the Mediterranean.
St. Petersburg at first showed apparent indifference when
France sought closer Franeo-Hussian ties.^3

Delicate negoti

ations, however, resulted in. the visit of the French fleet to
the Russian Haval base at Kronstadt in July, 1891.

*£he head

of the Russian Foreign Office, Nicholsi Giers, had attempted
to maintain ties with 'Germany, but on August 17, 1892, the
Chiefs of Staff of Russia and France concluded a military con
vention.

This provided that France would assist Russia if

attacked by Germany or by Germany and Austria together, and
Russia would support France in the event of a German attack,
either alone or in conjunction with Italy.

Mobilisation by

members of the Triple Alliance would bring Franco-Ewssian
mobilisation, and the agreement was to be in effect as long
as th© Triple Alliance.^
The apparent alignment of Russia with France had brought
a greater effort on the part of Germany to secure an alliance
with Great Britain.

If th© Reich could conclude such an agree

ment, the great coalition of Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary,
and Great Britain would deter any overt move on the part of
France or Russia.

The new German Government, however, was less

"a -K i L e *B r itR hShft.. ,'Tnt®?“®t^ “®|7| ivalry* 1885-1895, "
Altorseht-Carrta’
, Piplomatic History off Surooe. p. 296.
^

P* 212.

3^
astute than the old, and the expanded British interest in
colonies, coupled with the British policy of non*Involvement,
promised to forestall such an agreement.
The fall of the Salisbury Government in .August, 1892,
brought the aged Gladstone bach into power for the third
time, but Lord Rosebery, who favored continued friendship
with Germany, became Foreign Secretary; this move indicated
that Salisbury1s foreign policy, for the most oart, would he
continued.

The new government could not maintain an aloof

ness from other nations as Gladstone had attempted in the
past; some active foreign negotiations were necessary.

In a

memorandum written upon his retirement from office, Salisbury
declared his views on the European scenes
"The key of the present situation in Europe is
our position towards Italy and, through Italy
to the Triple Alliance* . . * If England was to
become more cold to Italy . . . or were to give
any indication of likelihood that she would even
give a moral preference to Franc© In the event
of a conflict, I think very serious risks to
European peace would be run.^as well as to the
interests of this country.***?
The friendship of the Triple Alliance was important to 'Eng
land both in Egypt and in the Mediterranean*

Rosebery told

Batzfoldt that there was the possibility that Great Britain
would act with Italy,"*

but the Foreign Secretary, like his

F. B* Kinsley, "'.international Rivalry, .1885-1895*M
OmlQiJrlm Ikitlsk
11
273.
26 Hatzfeldt to Holstein," November- 23, I892, 2&a Holfi&ULa .gaiwES, vol. HI, CorrgspQM.e.nGfi, 1.3.61-1396, Norman
Bieh and r!» II* Fisher, eds. {Cambridge: At the University
Press, 3.961}, pp.
no. 378. Hereafter cited as
Holstein £aasca»

r'

predecessor, was not ready to ally Groat Britain with any
country, including Italy.^
Valentine Chirol, the Berlin correspondent of The Times.
declared that the elections were not Indicative of the future
British policies.

Gladstone himself had lost a great deal of

personal influence,

and it was the head of the Radical Party

and a strong imperialist,

Joseph Chamberlain, who had gained

during the electionss
1 fchirol] believe the knell of the old narrowminded, Insular Radicalism has been sounded . . .
There will emerge a young h an acci-L party under
Chamberlain1s leadership, as thoroughly Imperial
ist,
etc., as thoroughly conscious of the world
wide rouge of our interests and duties, as the
Conservative party has always shown Itself to
be.
After the British elections Germany again attempted
to force conclusion of a treaty by suggesting that she
would tarn to Russia.

Haizfeldt probably first made this

suggestion to Salisbury, who was out of office, but In a later
letter to

Holstein the German Ambassador quoted and

an earlier opinion

that the Franco-Bussian Alliance

endorsed
posedno

threat to Germany*
The alliance between the Russians and Finnica causes
me no anxiety because I will always keep It with
in my power to purchase Russia*s neutrality in
the event of a Fr&ngo-Germ&n war, and we donft
need anything moro.^
-7 Tamper ley, British Foreign Policy, pp.
^ "Ghirol to Holstein," July 20, 1892, Holstein Papers.
Ill, lr21-*22, no. 375.
29 «Hatzfeldt to Holstein," November .28, 1892, Hols'
III, lk27> no. 378.
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Hnt^feldi^s optimism over Germany1s reopening the line
to St. Petersburg was rudely shattered the next year by fur**
ther Franco-Russian discussions and agreements.

The military

convention had not yet been formalised into an alliance, but
as both powers contended with a common enemy— Great Britain—
it was only natural that the convention would ripen into a
more permanent arrangement*
Russia had become involved in a. border dispute with
Afghanistan and sought to extend her domination over much of
the area.

Groat Britain, whose holdings in India were endan

gered. , immediately protested the action and threatened armed
intervontion,

Faced with this strong British stand Russia

ach.riovrledged clefoat. and retreated*~
France had likewise become involved In bittor disputes
with Great Britain.

In January9 1393? Gladstone, the old

non-interventionist, entered Bgypt and prevented the Fhedive
from establishing an anti-Fnglish government.^

On this oc

casion Russia failed to bach 'die French protest because the
tsar, in part, was -disillusioned by tho republican governraent which had allowed the Panama scandals.

The most

s ¥1111 am L. Longer, rh& I>iuloMaey o£ Imerialism* vol*
I (Few York: Alfred A. FnoprJ 193?T, p * 33* Hereaf-ter cited
as Longer, .Diplomacy of Lane rial ism. See also “Hosebery to
Queen Victoria,rf August 2H-, 1892• £• 2* &•» 3rd series, II*
1 5 > 1 9*.
si
^ For a detailed study of the British policy in Egypt
see I* B. Hiller,' ftThe Egyptian Question and British Foreign
Policy, 1892-139^,14 T&e Journal o£ Modern History XXXII (March
I960), I-!?.
32 Langer, Diplomacy a£ Imperialism. I, 38-39.

acute Anglo-French clash, however, arose In Slam,

Both

powers previously had established extensive claims in southern
Asia, and it was inevitable that a clash would occur.

On

July 13, 1893* France sent two gunboats up the Mekong River
to Bangkok and soon thereafter announced a blockade of the
neutral state.

Rosebery quickly protested this action and

began zo sound out the Triple Alliance for possible assistance.
Eventually France retreated from the possible showdown, and
Siam again became a buffer state between French Indo-China
and British

B u r m a . 33

Great Britain had won the first tests

of strength unassisted.
As the ties between Russia and France grew tighter,
she German opposition to the Caprivi a&ministration became
more and more outspoken.

The pro-BismarckIan press strongly

criticised the new Chancellor for his failure to maintain
security for Germany in Europe*

When the Iron Chancellor

left office there had been little'possibility of an ententp
between France and Russia; now there was the definite threat
of a two front war.

Germany eould not trust Groat Britain

In an ententes only an alliance was possible.

If a firm

agreement were not signed Great Britain would In all prob
ability precipitate a crisis between the Triple Alliance and
the Franco-Rus sian combination; she then would retreat into
her traditional policy of isolation.^
33 p # h . Hinsloy, **International Rivalry, 1885-1895*11
mbrldge British History. Ill, 278-279.

The tsar previously had been reluctant to permit an al
liance, but he at last gave way.

In October, 1893? Alexander

permitted a squadron of five ships to visit the '.french Kaditer*
ranean base at foulin; three months later the two governments
exchanged letters and the Franco-R u cs1an alliance came into
effect.

The choice of the Mediterranean part gave rise to

the belief that' the agreement was of an anti-British nature,
since the Royal Favy was strongest in trie ?Ted:Iterrr.nean•
Russia*s decision to maintain a squadron in the region and
her.attempts to negotiate a commercial treaty with Turkey
A*?
furdiar strengths' od this idea.
Rosebery sought to enlist the support of the Triple
Alliance in order to maintain British supremacy in the Mediter
ranean and keep Russia, from expanding, but Germany was decid
edly cool to this suggestion.

The British Foreign focrotary

refused to commit England to the Alllahoo.3®

Trio Fosslsehe

argued that
"it 's untilinlcable that Germany should promise
to protect India against a Russian attack, or
to take up her shield if France and Russia at
tacked the Suez Canal* * * . Russia1s real
enemy Is not the Triple Alliance— and least
all Is it G ormany— 'England is the real ©nemy.1^
Holstein expressed a similar sentiment in a letter to his
representative in London:

**I . . . have no intention of

3? IsKperley, British Foreign "ol.igy. p. 4-71.
3^ See ?. K. Hinsley, "Interna fcional Kiva-lries, 13B>»1895» *
EMSS. ScjJ&afa History. Ill, 230.
37 sontag, S.armany M

Bag,land, p. 283.

waiting until we [Germany] are left alone with England • ♦ •
38
England has simply exhausted the patience of her friends* "
At the same time, in an attempt to improve Russo-German
relations and perhaps sap the strength of the F^anco-Bussian.
agreement, Germany concluded a tariff agreement with Russia*3^
Rosebery apparently was undaunted by Germany's move to
ward Russia and felt that only Greece among the Mediterranean
countries would side with the tsar? Italy, Austria, Spain,
and Portugal would be sympathetic to Sngland*w

This support

could deter Russia from malting a m o w through the Straits.
The Franco-Russlan agreement led to sharp British criti
cism of Gladstone? the basic issue was whether Great Britain
should increase the size of her navy to cope with the new
threat in the Mediterranean*

The Prime Minister and Sir

William Hareourt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, opposed a
large increase in funds for the Admiralty, but the newspapers
and the Deposition had sufficiently aroused public opinion of
the danger to British security that Gladstone was obliged to
i»*1
resign.
Lord Rosebery moved from the post of Foreign
Secretary to that of Prime Minister.
3^ “Holstein to Hatzfel&t,'1 December 9, 1893* Holstein
Pasars« III, M*7, no. 390.
39 Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. I, 50-56.

1+0 "Hatzfeldt to Holstein," February 28, 189M-..Hals.te.la
Papers, ill, h6k~k6$, no. V 03.
^ Gladstone maintained that his hearing and eyesight
had forced him to resign, '•Gladstone to Queen Victoria,"
March 3, I89V, Q. V. L., 3rd Series, II, 371-372. See also
A. G. Gardiner, TJag, Life of Sir William Barcourt, vol. II,
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In l89*+ there were renewed territorial clashes in Africa
between Great Britain and Germany.

While as late as 1890 the

Caprivi Government had made large concessions, it now became
necessary to adopt a more ^forward1* foreign policy in order
to placate colonial interests at home.

The Colonial Society

increased its efforts to secure immediate action on the
question of territorial expansion.^

Even many German liberals

began to see Great Britain as the most formidable rival for
German activity, and they began to discuss the adoption of
anti-Eng11sh measures.^3
In November, 18939 Germany and England had agreed on
the western watershed of the Nile as a line of demarcation
between the German territory of Kamerun and the English in
terests in the Sudan.

Since Germany had no claims immediately

west of the line, Great Britain assumed that the Belch would
occupy the area to which she had renounced her claim and thus
block France from the Tllle Basin.

Germany, however, con

cluded an agreement with 'France which gave the latter the
territory which Germany had received from England*
result France again had free access to the Bile
ill
again threaten the British holdings*1 r

As a

' and could

(Londons Constable and Company, 1923), op. 2V+-208.
cited as Gardiner, Hareourt.

Hereafter

Paulina Kalyea Anderson, Tte gaytecaana 3L Anti-Bng1.1sh. Feeling in Germany;* 1890-1902 (Washingtons Th© American
Un 1veriityi5r e ss,1939), p. 1781 Hereafter cited as Anderson,
Anti-English Feeling. For a discussion of the Colonial Soci
ety* see Ibid.. pp. 177-19^*
^

Taylor, StxiAf.gM £2E Mas too:, pp. 3 W - 3 !*9.
Ibia.» 3 ^ .

Great Britain attempted to circumvent the FVancover
man agreement by concluding a treaty with Leopold II, King
of Belgium and owner of the Congo state,

Britain leased

some territory west of the Nile to Leopold in return for a
strip of land along the eastern border of the Congo Free
State from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Albert*

The latter

acquisition would reopen the possibility of an "all-red*1
route from Cape to Cairo, and Leopold’s control of the region
west of the Nile would keep France from expanding to the
east (See Map I, p, b2)*
France, as expected, protested the Anglo~Congolese
Treaty| she had never recognised the British sphere of in
fluence on the tipper File and had her own designs of crossing
Africa from west to east.

Great Britain, however, did not

expect the strong German protest*

The Heligoland Agreement

of 1890 had given Germany a common border to the Congo Free
State; the Anglo-Oongolese Treaty, by which England leased
a strip of territory along the east border of the Congo
Free State, had upset the earlier pact,

Germany thus had a

legal argument against the treaty, but because of the recent
German position, Great Britain did not expect a sudden ■pub
lic condemnation of her latest African venture.

Germany also

raised the question whether an international body had to
approve any change of territory of -the Free State, since the
assembled powers had Initially guaranteed the territory.**-*

**5 Sontag, Ssroaxor &a& England, pp. 287-293.
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rescind the treaty,

Marschall, the German Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs, oointed out that only by promptly with
drawn ng could England avoid compliest1 on s*^

Lord Rosebery,

In a conference with Count Deym, the Austro-Hungarian ambas
sador to London, declared that Germany should not oush Eng
land too fart
The style of the German note, though not unusual
in communications from Berlin, was insufferable
• * # if Germany were going to side with France
or appear to side with France in this and other
African questions, we [Great Britain] must recon
sider our jpasition as regards our general attitude
In Europe* '
Despite the stern warnings against interference which
passed from London to Berlin, the English posit:? on was rather
tenuous.

Sir Edward Balet, the British ambassador in Berlin,

pointed out that if Eng1and refused to give up the offensive

nrovi si ons in the Cong o *'■?recount Fr*'re*®* arc1 Ger many could
withdraw .from their guarantee of Congo neutrality.

In ad

dition to this Germany and France could unite in other mat
ters, such as Egypt, and precipitate additional crises for
t-') • * "? f-» V ) r ?
.LJt.1 i c
l
U u «

^ Sontag, fcarnffiny Pfocj, England,, p* 29^. rtMarschall to
Batnfeldt,ff June 9, lo9*, M &
iscfoen Kablnette. 1871-191^. Johannes Lepsins, Albrecht Men
delssohn-3artholdy, and Friedrich Thirnno, eds. (Berlin;
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Polltik und Geschichte,
I922-I927), Fill, Mf2-!
V-f3, no* 20*3. Hereafter cited as £. £
Rosebery to Queen Victoria,** June 13, 189^. 2* F, L*
3rd series, XI, *0Wf05«
^ 'ffalet to Queen Victoria,M June 15, 189^, Ibid,, V)5~
1x0*7

Germany soon withdrew her demand for the complete ab
rogation of the treaty, although France continued to exert
oressure on both Great Britain and the Belgian monarch*
On August l*f Leopold acceded to the French demand and with
drew from the agreement with England*

Anglo-German relations,

however, had already been seriously damaged*

Berlin had

sought to exert pressure on London in order to gain conces-*
sions, such as closer support of the Triple Alliance and
a greater influence in Samoa and probably %ould rather have
been paid for withdrawing her opposition than be forced to
insist on if.

This policy had again failed*

Forced to retreat from the ^ongo, Rosebery turned to
ward Paris and St. Petersburg in an attempt to discuss the
Afghan border dispute with Russia and settle Anglo-French
colonial problems*

The Prime Minister did not intend to

conclude an agreement with the Dual Alliance, for France and
Russia ware ^natural enemies14 of England.

These were genuine

problems and Rosebery wanted to solve them*

Of course, there

is always the possibility that Rosebery aspired to play
Germany1s game— by negotiating with the Dual Alliance, Ger—
CV)
many would recline the value of England1s friendship. *■'

.L.t,

.i-

v* *. *.w*. v .1* st.X4jL.jL.

Cambridge British Empire. Ill, 285.
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See also Taylor, Strug*

zla. sax yi&stexzt p V 3W-35V.
*° Hinslejr, loc. ei£,, pp. 285-239, Gardiner, Hgrcour.t
pp. 321-326, hanger, fllpiogiacy o£ imperialism. I, 1S5 - I W V
See also Taylor, Struggle for Hestary. op# 351-3o'?.

As r result of the ^ongo action, Germany and England
be canid nor© and more astranced*

The next m a r 11"© Retell

refused to join Britain in intervening in the Sino-Japanese
War, although it later intervened in co-operation with Russia#
Many English newspapers reported that Germany was serving
Russia, and one mentioned that It was either w the sudden im
pulses of Germany8s ruler81 or a 18perverse desire to do the
opposite of whatever is done or favored by Great Britain,11S*which dictated the German action#

After Shimonosoki Great

Britain ended, her attempts at collaboration with France and
Russia and retreated from continental affairs#

The affront

to British pride which the Kaiser made in January, 1896, fur
ther isolated Great Britain and brought .Anglo-German relations
almost to the breaking ooint.^2
Germany had shown interest in the Transvaal region over
since she began her colonial activity in 188*** but Bngland
had effectively prevented her from making strong ties with
the Boer Republic#

Great Britain controlled the territory

around the Transvaal with the exception of the land to the
east which was govern®& by Portugal (Be© Map II, p. **6).
Mozambique, or Portuguese Rost Africa., thus had acquired a
value far in excess of what it might have had*
^ JhS. 9ija
d » for 11 26, 1895, quoted in Or on James
Hale, B M J M M B M nS ^ s m s x HJJsJl
£2 m
■].and, spiff
ev f o t k T v V ^hpplet on-Century
Company, I9W ) , p# .10*?# Hereafter cited as Hale, Piyol.ilq.lt;
Mid Oioloaaov#'
{■
. H.
Hinslay* "International Blvalry. 1885—1895,"
SaakEkaaa jfeltdah fiaaisa, m , 285.
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In 1B91 Cecil Rhodes, the English 1userlallst, attempted
to purchase the entire 'Fzambicu© terrltory5 Portugal cpu ebly
rejected hie offer*

She also turned down Germany1s offer to

err chase the Delagoa fay-Pretoria HalXvay, even though she
*5U
was in dire financial straits.
The London Con vent 1on of 188** had in oiled that the Boer
Republic was under British suzerainty, hut In January* 1395,
President Kruger declared that the Transvaal was indeognrlont•
The next month he sir no cl a treaty with ";ortuyal, and In
August of the some year he concluded an agreement with Hol
land*

Germany approved the President1s action,

although
55
Greet Britain refused to recognise either agreement*
As a useu.lt of the ■increasingly important roles played
by the .few Gorman industrialists in the Trcnsvsal, Cape
Colony officials sought to strengthen their waning Influence
by more direct and forceful means.

In the latter sort of

December, 1895, Dr* T,* S. J© me son led a band of adventurers
into the T'ransvaal In order to assist a planned ITitlunder
uprising.

Vo simultaneous revolt occurred, and the Tr&ns-

gu.

C* D* Fenner, “Germany and the Transvaal Before 1896,M
The Journal of Modern Hi star..7 XII (March 19**0), 36-37, ^-7*
Hereafter cited as Fanner, “Germany and Transvaal.’1 See
also Cecil He&dlam, TIi^ Hilper Papers, (Londons Cassell and
Company, Ltd., 1931), IT? 3, 32. Hereafter cited as Headlaffi,
M I M m . EMmj.*
??
Fenner, “Germany and Transvaal.,11 p. 52. Se© also
John Doan, Blehford and Cclgar !?• Johnson. “The Contemplated
Anglo—German Alliance, 1890-1901,n The. Political Science
Quarterly XL11 (March 1927), 15. Hereafter cited as Bick
ford, 11Anglo-German A11 lance.11

vaal authorities, previously informed of the planned raid,
easily captured the band*
Since Jameson had organised the expedition in British
Bechuanaland, both the Boer and the German Governments ac
cused Britain of instigating the "filibustering campaign.*1
Lord Salisbury, who had become Prime Minister in June, 1895,
informed Hatsfeldt that Great Britain did not approve of th©
raid, and the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, also
denied any

foreknowledge of the expedition.

He had even at

tempted to recall Jameson before he learned whether the ex
pedition was successful.^
Germany's re-entry into the colonial field after the
dismissal of Caprivi, William's desire to- build Germany into
a strong naval power, and the renewed nationalistic fervor
all seemed to propel Germany into a policy of Weitoolit.Ik *^7
It was at this moment that the Jameson Bail occurred, and
the Kaiser sent his famous congratulatory telegram to President Kruger.

William at first sought more drastic meas

ures, perhaps as the result of a rebuff which he had experi
enced in England earlier that

y

e

a

r

,

his Chancellor,

In reference to the part played by the English Govern
ment see A. F. Madden, "Changing Attitudes and Widening Res
ponsibilities, Caaflffil&gfl Brij&gh Kt&torv. HI, 357-360, J. L.
Garvin, The 3j»ife of Joseph ChamberlainTLondonz Macmillan and
Co., Ltd., 1 9 3 W xiI7TC-90* lS5iafter cited as Garvin,
Chamberlain, and Longer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. I, 23$-2^0.
Anderson, Anti-English Feellag, pp. 232-233.
68

See Langer, tttnloaaey a£ JmvaxAalXam* I, 237.
Holstein gaaara. vol. I, Ifeaotrs, pp. 160-161.
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Hohenlohe, and Ma.rs.chal!, the Secretary of State, dissuaded
him from this action*
The Kruger telegram aroused public opinion in both
German newspapers, almost without ex

Germany and England.

ception, hailed the Kaiserfs communique,^

and the English

newspapers were just as outspoken in their denunciations of
German ambitions*^

The Kaiser*s reference to the indepen

dence of the Transvaal was quite offensive to the British,
and his decision to send assistance to the Boers through
Portuguese territory was even more upsetting.

English news

papers denounced the entire German action as part of a pre
meditated plot against England which only required an inci
dent to he put into effect.

Chamberlain called for an "act

of vigor"against Germany.
Great Britain became more and more estranged from Ger
many during 1896, despite a further German effort to conclude
6l
a secret alliance,
and a torrent of anti-German publications
poured from the British press*

Many saw the German effort .as

part of a growing piox against British manufactured items*
Germany again had attempted to force England into turning

60 Anderson, MU-gB&Ufift

gSUQJM,*

PP« 233-233.

6!

Hale, Publicity a M Diplomacy, pp. 11, 1 1 7 - 1 0 .
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"Salisbury to Queen Tietorla," January 12, 1896,
£* V. X,., 3rd Series, III, 20-21*
Langer, Diplomacy a£ Imperialism. I,
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toward the Alliance, but she again had failed*

The Kruger

telegram had aroused a strong national pride in a growing
navy* an expanding Empire, and a rich South Africa*

f,U it lander,**

,f0elagoa Bay,M and "Kruger,H became household words; they

whetted the interest and excited the imagination of all*

The

German threats had not turned British interests from Africa,

but rather they had strengthened them*

In both northern and

southern Africa England expressed her determination to main*
tain her hold*

Within two years of the telegram, which was

perhaps the nadir of Anglo-German relations, a mutual desire
to secure .an agreement again turned jtaglo»German negotiations
toward southern Africa*

CHAPTER III
FOBTCfGAXt’S FIBAMCIAL CRISIS
Th© discovery of gold and diamonds in southern Africa

had intensified European interest in th© new continent*

Al

though British influence was quite strong in South Africa,

the Transvaal rendered complete control an impossibility*
Great Britain sought to secure the last non-British ter
ritory surrounding the Boer R epublie~Portuguese Mozambique.
for many years there had existed a strong bond of friend
ship between England and Portugal.

The spirit of amity dated

from 1373 when Edward II of England and Ferdinand I of Por
tugal announced a covenant of mutual support.

Oliver Crom

well, Charles IX, and others added to the provisions until the
first agreement had become a full alliance.
In I8l7 England and Portugal signed an agreement which
recognized as Portugal fs the territory fro© Cape Delgado to
the Bay of Lorenzo Marques.

Th© territory acquired a greater

importance as interest rose in South Africa, and since the
two powers had not precisely defined "Bay of Lorenzo Marques,"
there arose disputes over the extent of the Portuguese posses
sions.

England increased her efforts to secure Delagoa Bay in

an attempt to end the supply of guns smuggled in through the
port and given to the natives*

Falling to reach agreement

52
over the territory, both countries referred the matter to the
arbitration of President Mad? ah on of France.

During the de

liberations Great Britain proposed that the nation in whose
favor the arbitration was decided would not sell any of the
disputed territory without giving the initial opportunity to
purchase the land to the nation which lost the decisions to
this Portugal readily agreed.

On July 28 , 1875? MacMahon

announced his decision in favor of Portugal; Great Britain
abided by the decision and withdrew her claim to the area**
In February, I08*f, ostensibly In accord with the AngloPortuguese entente although it was actually an attempt to
prevent French expansion, Great Britain recognised an old
(and reluctant) Portuguese claim to the mouth of the Congo
Blver.

Soon after this Germany entered the ranks of the

African colonial powers, and in accord with Franco, forced
England to give up her recognition of Portuguese ownership.
There were some in Portugal who

objected to giving up

the Portuguese claims to the mouth of the ^ongo; they at
tributed the cancellation of the Anglo- Fortuguese treaty of
18S*f to English indifference rather than International dif
ficulties.

Perhaps, some argued, Portugal should not have

tied herself so closely to England; Germany seemed to be
the "rising star•51 Partly in an effort to chow opposition
to Great Britain Portugal expressed,a willingness to construct
x Raymond ¥» B.lxLer, "Anglo-Portuguese ‘
R ivalry for Delagoa Bay," The Journal, of Modern lilsbprv TJ (December 1931*),
k*2p,
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th© oft-proposed Pretoria-Delagoa fay fallway.

This would

divert mere Transvaal goods from th© Cap© Colony to the Por
tuguese port.

In March, 1887, Colonel Edward McMnrdo, a

citizen of the United States, formed a. company In London
with a capital of 4500,000.

Construct:!on began in tbs sum

mer, and it was almost completed in November of the following
year.

In June, IS89, the Portuguese Government seised the

railway for not having completed the line to the appointed
terminus within the contract period.

The United States and

Great Britain both demanded that their citizens be compen
sated «

th the antumn of I.890 the three 9oyernmonts aereed

that three Swiss jurists should determine the amount of como
oensetion due the stockholders.^
There were additional Anglo-Portuguese difficulties
beginning in November, 1389.

Portugal had sought to secure

territory from the east to the west coasts In southern
Africa linking her 'two holdings of Angola and Mozambique, but
Great Britain assarted her own Interests In the area.

On

January 11 the British minister In Lisbon was told to demand
that Portugal withdraw her claim from central Africa.

If

Portugal refused the British minister’s request, he was to
%
leave Lisbon.
Portugal withdraw her claim.

2 Montague George Jessett, 2 M

M

g

12

Mrl-O.ai

(new Yorki New Amsterdam Book Company, 1899),
ppV 116-121* Hereafter cited as Jessett, Dolauoa Bqy.
3 H. 7. Livermore,
History of Portugal (Cambridges
At the University Press, 19W)f
Hereafter cited
as Livermore, Porti
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Soon after Portugal retreated in central Africa, the For*
tuguese Government placed an AngXo-Portuguese agreement
before the Cortes for ratification.

Under the terras of the

agreement Portugal would construct a railroad from Fungive
Bay to the British sphere of influence and also would promise
not to cede certain territories f%i. thout the consent of Great
Britain.tr The Lisbon press waged a strong battle against
the agreement and declared that it virtually established a
British protectorate over Uosambigue*

Although Portugal was

to finance the railroad, only Great Britain would benefit.
The British offer to change the wording of the agreement did
not lessen the violent opposition, and the members of the
Cortes shouted down the proposal.
Portugal soon faced another most difficult problem.
During the estrangement from England, Portugal raised her
taxes by six per cent.

Despite this effort to balance the

budget, the deficit for 1891 amounted to mere than one tenth
of the entire budget.

The government curtailed public works

projects, trimmed governmental staffs, and reduced the pay
of officials.

It soon became apparent that the government

could not even pay the interest on the external debt.
ers

began to demand a hand in the adv nistration.

taxes only caused unrest in the larger towns.

h
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Additional

Burnerous in-
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(London»

Harrison and Sons), d9-90. It was not until June 11, 1091,
that the two countries signed an agreement defining their
respective spheres of influence in Africa. The later agree*
raent was substantially the same as the one first proposed.

surrection$

in Portugal1s African possessions caused a further

drain on the national treasury*

9

Many felt that Portugal was on the verge of revolution*
Hie tsar discussed the menacing situation in Spain, Portu
gal, and Italy; Salisbury anti the German ambassador to London,
Paul von Katafel&i, considered the problem of a possible
republican revolution in Portugal and the future of the Por~
, 6
'GugussQ co:..on:ia.i possessions.
,

*

-»

Germany, in particular, was concerned about the Portu
guese problem;
A Portuguese republic, which would soon be fol
lowed by a Spanish Republic, would constitute well
nigh the greatest political danger to the Triple
Alliance, and to each separate somber of It, most
especially to us[GormanyJ» It would not only
deliver France from any anxiety about Spain, but
would also inevitably canoe the entire peninsula
to depend on her,- would give the French" fresh
courage to attack us and might touch off another
war. 7
On March 18, 1891, the German Foreign Office instructed
Hatzfeldt to warn England against acquiring the Portuguese
colonial empire In the eastern part of Africa.

Salisbury

gave Hatsfeldt the impression that Great Britain would b©
willing to reach an agreement over the Portuguese colonies.
The next day Hatzfeldt inquired whether he should take part
in negotiations concerning the partition of the Portuguese
^ G, P. White, 4 .Century of SaaiQ .ana Portugal. 178S1898 (Londons .Methuen & Co., 1909J, op. 3?0-3 p .
Hereafter
cited as White, Spain and Portugal.

colonial .possessions| the 3ornan Foreign Office agreed.

When

Hatzfeldfc mentioned Germany’s interest *n securing the Por
tuguese possessions on the cart coast of Africa, 3a 1- sbury
rsnlled,

“slQEa, aivlaons."8

T-farschall, however, later declared that Germany’s main
Interest was the preservation. of the monarchy in Portugal,
not the division of colonies.

Although he could not aequies©

in the partition of Portuguese colonies, Marschali declared
that he would not refuse the British owned islands of Zanzi
bar and Pemba as compensation for German assistance.

Should

England refuse to take Germany’s interests Into account,
Harschall declared, Germany could always turn to France and
exert pressure against Egypt.

0

On Parch PI, 189-1} Hat&foldt declared that
If the Portuguese monarchy should fall, the only
remaining possibility was a Spanish entry into
Portugal and its subsequent annexation by Spain,
together with an .Anglo-German agreement on the
future of the Portuguese colonies.^
The Wilhelmstrasse although stressing its desire to maintain
the Portuguese monarchy, wanted to secure British support
for a Spanish annexation if the monarch were overthrown.
This,' it was felt, would prevent a series of Republican
revolutions from again sweeping the continent.

The British

Prime Minister refused to even consider this proposal and
8 B tila& ata. £aassa»

9 Ibid.. 372.

10 ibid.
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declared that he would rather sacrifice Egypt for an .Anglo*
French alliance than support a monarchical alliance against
Portugal
Both Great Britain and Portugal agreed that Germany
should arbitrates their Bast African dispute#

Katsfeldt

served as moderator in the London negotiations between the
Portuguese representative, the Marquis Luis de Several, and

the British Prise Minister, and he no doubt interjected his
Government 1s ideas into the proceedings#

On June 11, 1891,

the two powers signed a treaty which ended the Bast African,
border dispute and ended the threat of renewed anti-English
viol erica in Portugal*
Further financial difficulties plagued the Portuguese
government.

Foreign 'bondholders blocked several attempts

to reduce the external debt, and it was riot until late 1892
that some confidence was temporarily restored.

¥hen it

became necessary to raise taxes again, the Cabinet was overlp
thrown.
At the same time the clerical problem again came
to the fore in Portuguese politics, as King Carlos, whose
extra gavarice and licentiousness had caused many of the domes
tic problems, suppressed certain clerical opponents.

The

Pope even intimated that he would not receive the Catholic
king if he came to Home.

By 1895 the situation had become

so serious no to warrant the government's rule by decree.
11 Holstein Parers.
12 Li'.'ornor o,

37k.
p. 0+5.

The government reduced the franchise and the number of delegates in the Cortes* J

Further colonial unrisings put an

added strain on the budget as the Lisbon Government dispatched
more troops and supplies to Africa.

Hie undeveloped colonies

were a great liability, but the Portuguese officials were
violently opposed to any proposal concerning the alienation of
the colonial possess ions.
Cecil Hhodes had attempted to purchase the southern
portion of Mozambique on several occasions between 1391 and
1897, but each time he failed.

As foreign banking interests

were concernod over Portugal1s possible financial collapse,
it was natural that the British would attempt to tie the two
questions together.

If Portugal would either cede Mozambique

in return for a cancellation of part of the debt or accept
a loan with the revenue of the colonies as security, both
Great Britain and Portugal would have solved major problems.

7h.

Portugal would have reduced her debt, and Great Britain would
have eliminate the Transvaal as a threat in South Africa.
In early Miy, 1397, Joseph Chamberlain suggested to the
Marquis de Several, who had become the Portuguese minister In
London, a possible Anglo-°ortuguese agreenaerat xn South Africa
in which England would guarantee Portugal *s African posses
sions if Portugal would prohibit every country access to the
Transvaal, except by the railway.

Both the railway and the

white, B m i n a,nd Portugal, p. 3?1.
^

Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. I, 520.
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port would be operated by an Anglo-Por tugues© Company, which
would Improve the facilities and provide money for a settle
ment of damages awarded by the Swiss panal of judges meeting
in Bern,

The Colonial Secretary also suggested that Portu

gal raise a loan in London using her colonies, the railway,
and the general revenues as security for the British territorial guarantoos,

15

Several fait that the concessions on the part of his

government wore too groat.

Ho doubt his government would ac

cept a ‘British loan using all the African colonies except
Lorenzo Marques as security, but it would never accept the

possibility of losing all her colonics in the event of a
default on the loan.
proval be isjl*3

The question of accepting British ap

or tugal could grant any concession Several

also rejected, since "it would detract from the sovereign
rights of Portugal and would be rejected by the Cortes and
public opinion.ft^
A new government came to power in Portugal shortly after
the beginning of the Several-Salisbury conversations over
the Portuguese finances and African colonies.

As there was

concern over the British desire for expansion in South Af
rica, the Portuguese Liberal Government decided to terminate
3-5 "Memorandum by Mr. Bertie on England and Portugal in
o&
QrjUina a! i M
Africa." May X* 1893, I r i t i s
W a r . 1898-191^. G. P. Gooch and Harold Teraperley, eds,

(Lon-

dons M s Majesty*s Stationery Office, 1926-1933), I, ^5, no.
65. Hereafter cited as B. ]>*
16 JMi.* ^5-W.

the discussions,

in place of a renewed growth of Anglo

phobia, however, there grew a definite fear of the German
iMjaaIA.fcys»17
The Portuguese Government was quite wary of attempts
to secure her African colonial possessions*

Germany and

Great Britain, the nations whose colonies bordered the Por
tuguese African, possessions, were particularly suspect*

The

stoning of a German consulate in Mozambique in December, 1896,
brought strong protests from Germany, and although the mat
ter was settled peacefully, it did bring cooler relations
*1O
between Germany and Portugal* The, Tines later described the
continuing incidents between the Portuguese civilians and
the German nationals in Mozambique as "assuming an alarming
form.
During the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations of 1397 it
appeared to Germany that the conferences would lead to a
rapprochement over southern Africa*

Such an agreement could

isolate the Boer Bepublic and further jeopardise the German
Since the Reich had already asOCi
sisted the Transvaal through armaments
and had given moral

investment in South Africa.

T7 Livermore, Portugal * p. Vls*5. The German Government
recalled Derenthail, the German Minister in Lisbon, for having
not sufficiently supported German interests during the AngloPortuguese discussions, Anderson, Anti-Sngilsh Feeling, p* 225^

Tho (London) Times. December 16, 1096.

19 Ibid. - .T"-!-r

1PQ7.

The value of Gorman war materials Imported by the
Transvaal through Delagoa Bay amounted to sore than 4250,000
in 1897. Headlam, W d m L
I» 2*tl-2*fr2.
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support to President Kruger, it became necessary to formu
late a policy for South Africa in the event London and Lis
bon reached accord over Mozambique.

Hatzfeldt urged an

tag lo—German. agreement in which Germany would receive ter
ritorial compensation if Great Britain attacked the Trans
vaal*

The' German ambassador received the impression from

Salisbury that Germany and England could reach an agreement
over the Transvaal if the price were not too high and also
that there could he a possible arrangement over the Portupt
guese colonies*
In June, X897, Count Bernhard von Buelow replaced Baron
von Msrschall as Secretary of State;

he soon began to press

for an increased navy which he said was necessary to protect
pp
Germany’s increased trade an 0ommerc0* ~ The falser also
wanted a stronger navy, but he saw it primarily as a poten
tial instrument of rivalry with Great Britain.

Although

William still entertained hopes of a solid Anglo-German al
liance, there is evidence that he took some pleasure in
antagonizing Great Britain.

Regardless of the motives for

naval, expansion, it became obvious that Germany needed ad
ditional coaling stations for her proposed navy.

Since

Germany held some of the Portuguese debt, it was possible
^ Longer, BiD.lom.acv of Imperialism. I, ?2I.
po
w Benson, Kaiser
English Relations, p. I3I. Bernhard von Suelow, Memoirs of Mrlnee yon Buelow, Mol. I, .T-om
.Secretary a£ 3tqie to .Iwrsri.al Chanc.ell^F, l W 7 -:i903- F. A.

Voigt, trans* (Boston? Little, Broun, and Company, I93D ,
pp. 60, 120, 222-227. Hereafter cited as Buelow, Memoirs *
Benson, Kaiser

Baalish Relations, p. 132.

that she could seise Portuguese territory--Azores, Madeira,
Capo Terde, St. Thomas, Angola, Mozambique, Macao, and Timor—
as coaling stations.

ok

The Portuguese debt steadily increased during 1897,
while, at the same time, the government became less suspicious
of British designs on. her colonies.
Commission

In March, 139&, the Bern

announced the results of a preliminary investiga

tion of the value of the railway which Portugal had seized in
1889*

Although both sides immediately filed ^observations*1

to the decision, it was apparent that the final award would
be much greater than £*255,000, the value of the construction
at the time of its seizure."*^

As Portugalfs debt continued

to mount, it became necessary to reopen negotiations for
financial assistancef Portugal again turned to Great Britain.
The terms under consideration for an Anglo-Portuguese
loan in 1893 were substantially the same as those of the
previous year.

Lisbon sought a loan of &8 ,000,000 at three

per cant interest.

This would provide funds for paying off

the floating debt and still leave a sufficient amount for the
Bern Award.

In exchange for this Portugal would agreed to

the joint management of the railway in Mozambique and Delagoa
^ tfMemorandum by Hr • Bertie on lungland and Portugal In
Africa,n m y 1, 1898, £. 2 ., I, **6 , no. 65.
^ Jessett, Delayoa Bay, pp. 120-123* The investigating
commission placed the value of the concession, as of December
31, 1896, at LI,800,000. It is interssting to note that
Great Britain and the United Gt&tes sought no raise the award
byLL,000,000, Ibid.. pp. 122, 12^-f.
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Bay and would make no further concessions to other countries
without British consent*

Great Britain would be allowed to

use all Portuguese ports as coaling stations during war,
and, above all, she would receive temporary control of Belagoa Bay and .the railway in the event of hostilities in the
Trans v aal*^

By May, 209®, Great Britain and Portugal- seemed

close to agreement, but as additional obstacles presented
themselves, the Portuguese adopted a more cautious attitude
in the negotiations for the loan*

20 Garvin, Chajmhar'Iq^ i'.-.I, 310-311.
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CHAPTER IV
BIHGLAHD, GkRMAEY, MID TIB PORTUGUESE LOAN
In the latter part of 109? Germany again bod the op
portunity to demonstrate her colonial aspirations*

When the

Chinese attacked a German missionary station at Y@n-chu-fu
in Shantung, the WiIhelastra sse had an excuse for interven
tion.

In November, 1897, Germany seised Xiao-Ghow ostensibly

in retaliation against the murder of the two missionaries!
the real reason, however, was in accord with a Weitr,ol.ltIk
motive*

’'Germany, tf as A. J* P. Taylor so antly describes the

incident, Tln8<3dad a coaling-station for her non-existent
fleet— and thereafter a fleet to protect her coaling-station.
The Falser, who had become fasc‘noted by the Intricacies of
a strong navy, naturally supported the German action in the
Far Bast.2
The growing concern over the German naval preparations
caused Great Britain to seek a great accord for her farflung Interests,

She offered to settle Anglo-Eussian prob

lems in Asia In February, 1893, but was rebuffed«

Since

1 Taylor, .'Struggle J&x Mastery, p. 375.
2 "William to Buelow," November 7, 1897, fl, £., XTV (Part
1), 69-71, no. 3690. German Olplomatle .PocumentsT 1871-191^-.
B. T. S* Dugdale, trans* and e d . ( H e w York: Harpers and
Brothers, Publishers, 1930), 111, 15. Hereafter'cited as
■Dttgdale, g. D. 0 .
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there appeared to be little hop© of limiting Russian expan
sion in Asia through an Anglo-Russian understanding* Great
Britain turned to Germany*^ The next month Great Britain and
Germany collaborated on a loan to China.

If the two countries

could co-operate on a small scale * some argued, could not
the post-Jameson animosities be suppressed in order to secure

the long-awaited Anglo-German entente?

Soon Hatzfeldt, Salis

bury* and Chamberlain opened discussions in an attempt to

reach a closer understanding between the two countries*
There is some confusion as to which side opened negoti
ations and. declared itself in .favor of an agreement*

It is

an important question, since the historian’s interpretation
of the later negotiations, de sends on his view of the begin
nings*

Although Germany had long sought ties with Great

Britain, the Kaiser had often made such a policy quite dif
ficult.

Friedrich von Holst©In, the leading figure in the

German Foreign Office, and Alfred von Tirpitz, the father of
the Germany* navy, were both skeptical of ties with Great

Britain.

Katzfel&t cautiously favored an agreement, but the

secretary of the German Embassy in London, Baron von Bckhardstein was wholly In favor of an alliance*
ter discussed the question of an

When the lat

Anglo-German agreement with

the Kaiser, he found a strong supporter*

Boon returning to

London, Ackardstein suggested that the Colonial Secretary
bring up the question of an

alliance with Hatzfeldt#

Since

3 "Nicholas II to William II," May 22, 1898, g. P.,
XIV (Part 1), 250-251, no. 3 8 0 3 . Dugdale, G. £.'
, Til, 20n.
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BekarGstein had informed neither Katnfeldt nor BueXov about
hms

jL-i.02? c*‘
Oir<rorsa.t-!.■.'
:ii vv-.-Go c*n© jur-L

--u.Oiiia-L Secretary?

'the German officials reported' that England had initiated the
discussions#
Germany had 'Whetted the British appetite for an alliance,
although Great Britain did not need much prodding.

Com Paul

Kruger1s re-election by so large a majority on February 10,
1398, made an Anglo-Boer conflict appear imminent, and Sir
Alfred Hilrter, the British high commissioner in South Africa,
reported

armsbuild-up, which included the emplace

ment of four large Krupp guns and the investment of over
41,pOO,000 on forts in the Johannesburg area.

At the same

time the Boer Government called for a volunteer army of oyer
10,000 and required ©very burgher to hold over 500 rounds of
ammunition."

Since Germany was assisting in military prepar

ations in th© Transvaal and German officers commanded the
artillery, Great Britain was forced to take steps to reduce
the threat of a. German-Boar combination in South Africa*
There is no doubt that Chamberlain sought an AngloGerman rapppoc.li©pent at this time; he soon favored an alli
ance.

The Colonial Secretary declared that Germany and

La n g e r ^Diglogacy1 of jaaar.taltam._II. 501-502._Garvin,
Chamber l ain. XIT7 " 2 5 5 ^ 2 7 “ Dagdale, 2*'2* £•» X U , 21.
It
appears likely, however, that Holstein and the German Foreign
Office were encouraging Eckar&stein to prod Chamberlain Into
an alliance. The Holstein Papers on this period had not been

released when this thesis was submitted.
^ f,Milner to Hr s. Qaskell,rf June 22, 1 8 9 8 , Milnep Papers,

I, 3kl-Sb2.
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England had the same basic interests, and if the two powers
could reach a general agreement, the colonial differences

would solve themselves*

Great Britain could no longer

maintain a policy of isolation.

Chamberlain* according to

Hatssfeldt* wished quickly to conclude a binding agreement

£
between England and the Triple Alliance* '
Although Germany first raised the question of an alli
ance, she was in no hurry to reach an agreement.

England

needed Germany more than Germany needed England.

The Wil

helms trass e saw the opportunity of expanding the Triple Al

liance into a Quadruple Alliancef perhaps she could also
extract additional, concessions.

In the meantime it would

be better to forestall the conclusion of an alliance.
Hatz.felclt, armed with instructions from the Wilhelmstrasse, met with Chamberlain on April 1, 1 898f he presented
his government1s object ions to an alliance*

The British

parliamentary system would make England a most unstable
ally, for a new government easily could overthrow

agreement.

a previous

As a result of her system of government, England

could give no assurances of a continuity of policy.

Buelow

also suggested in his instructions to Hatsfeldt that it
might be wiser for Germany to attempt to eliminate the dan
ger of the Dual Alliance through agreement with Russia than
to try to oppose the Alliance by a show of strength in an
6 "Hatzfeldt to Buelow," March 29, 1898, a. P., X I V
(P&rt 1), 196-199, no. 3 7 O 2 . Oarvin, Chamberlain."!!!. 260-

.
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entente with England*^
The Colonial Secretary, in defending his proposal,
pointed out that a British Parliament had never repudiated a
treaty concluded by an earlier parliament*

On the other

hand, governments ruled by a single individual, such as Rus
sia, often altered thair policy with every change of the
head of stats*

At this conference the Colonial Secretary

also told Hatzfeldt that when ho spoke of English support
for an Anglo-German alliance, he was speaking only for him
self | be could not speak for his colleagues#®

An April 3 rd dispatch from the VJiihelmstr&sse was dis
tinctly cool toward an Anglo-German alliance.

There could

never be an alliance between England and Germany, it argued,
because the former had democratic institutions^ the English

public would never allow an agreement.

Likewise* the Ger

man people would be opposed to an Anglo-German connection,

because England*s continued attempts to expand her influence
in colonial affairs kept Germany*s population in a definite
n

anti-English mood.''
Two days later, in a. dispatch to the Chancellor, Hatzfeldt
/ “Buelow to Hatzfeldt,” March 30, 1098, G. P., XIV
(Part 1), 199-202. no* 3783, Garvin, Chamberlain«~TTI« ?S1262
Q
“Chamberlain1s Second lienorendun,M Apr.il 1, 1890,
Garvin, Chamberlain* III, 263-266.
#

5 "Buelow to Hatzfeldt," Anril 3, 1 8 9 8 , <5. £. XT7
(Part 1), PCA-P.O?, no. 373?.
See nlrc- "I^sc&lleo to Pallsb u r y , 11 February 1, I89O, B. P., I, G-B-Ab, no, 63.
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said that Sir Arthur Balfour, the acting Foreign Secretary
during the illness of Lord Salisbury, agreed with his argu
ment s against the Anglo-German alliance*

The two also

agreed that the best way to achieve closer connections be
tween the two countries was to remove the ill-feeling between
them by
an accommodating attitude of both Governments in
small questions and to prepare public opinion
both here and in Germany for a possible future
politica.l r appr oehement*
The statement summarises the actions ox the two ^governments,
particularly Great Britain, during the succeeding months*

On April 10 the Kaiser presented his views of the pur
poses of the Anglo-German negotiations to the Foreign Office.
It is an analytical and accurate statement of the policy

which Germany was to follow in her negotiations with Eng
land s

It is of great importance to keep official senti
ment in England favourable to us and hopeful * A
friendly-minded England puts another card against
Kussia in our hands, as well as giving us the pro
spect of winrh rxg1from England colonial and commer
cial advantages.
It would be Hatzfeldt1s duty, continued William, to put
off the conclusion of a formal alliance, not by
a rejection wounding to English feeling but so
as to manifest a cordial wish for beneficent cooneration*
3-0 {,Hotzfeldt to Hohenlohs,tf Aoril 7, 1899, 0. P.
(Part 1 ), 211, no. 3788. Ougdale, G. £• fix, III,*"257
G.
Or-

11 ^
iam 11. to the Wi Ihelms tra sse,ff Apr i1,10, 1898 ,tf
X 17 (Part 1), 217, no. 3790, Ga-in, flaatoslaliu Ill,
f-*
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Bekardstain contlnued to serve as a liaison between the
Kaiser end the British Colonial Secretary, but he was no

doubt unaware of the duplicity of the German foreign policy
toward Bug!and.

At the same time William was telling the

Wilhelmstrass© to avoid an alliance with England, Eekardstein, was Informing Chamberlain that William was not only
elated at the prospect of an Anglo-German alliance, but that
he also wished for the negotiations to he a c c e l e r a t e d . ^
On April

Chamberlain conferred with Hatsfeldt; they

again discussed the proposed Anglo-German alliance, and the
German ambassador continued to throw up obstacles to the
agreement.

If the negotiations were to become public and

then fail to bring an alliance, Hatsfeldt argued, the news
of the German participation in th© discti.ssi.ons would per
manently alienate Russia and Germany.

If the treaty ver© a

public document, the British Parliament could reject it,
leaving Germany isolated.

If it w ere a private arrangement,

future British Governments could repudiate it.

Bather than

conclude a direct defensive alliance with Germany, Hatsfeldt
suggested that Chamberlain strengthen British ties with the
Triple Alliance through closer relations with Italy and
Austria.

To this Chamberlain was definitely cool;

was the key.

Germany

If there could be an Anglo-Goraan alliance,

Italy and Austria, of necessity, won'td participate,

in

closing, Chamberlain hinted that if Germany did not want an
13 Bckar&stein, .llrtimerungap. I, 29**-296.
iSElain, m * 270-271.

Garvin, Cham-
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alliance with England, he could secure support elsewhere*

*1

The British Prime Minister was generally less enthusi
astic about the idea of an alliance with Germany than was his
Radical subordinate, but even he manifested favorable interest
In the negotiations whan he returned to London*

Chamber

lain sent Salisbury a record of his proposals and conversa
tions with Hatzf©l&t.

The Prise Minister agreed that a

"closer relation with. Germany would be very desirable,11 but,
he then ashed, "can we get it?r,^5
On Hay 13? 1898, Chamberlain attempted to set the stage
for a "closer relation with Germany" when he spoke out
against the British policy of isolation in a speech at Bir
mingham 5
Since the Crimean War * . . the policy of this
country has been a policy of strict isolation*
We have had no allies. I am afraid we have had
no Friends. * * . We are liable to be confronted
any moment with a combination of Great Powers.
. • . We b tand alone.
The policy of isolation, insisted Chamberlain, would be
particularly disastrous for Great Britain in China;

if

England could secure assistance from some other power, she
should follow that courses
We must not allow our Jingos to drive us into
quarrel with all the world at the same time,
"Chamberlain1s Fourth Memorandum," April 25,

Garvin,

ill? 273-275.
"Salisbury to Chamberlain," May 2, 1898, Ibid*, 279.
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and we must not reject the Idea of an alliance
with those Powers whose Interests are most
nearly approximate to onr own.~*v
The Birmingham speech apparently contradicted a Salisbury
address of Hay *+$ Sir William Earcourt, the former Chancellor
18
of the Exchequer, referred to it as a ’’counter-manifesto.,f*
Although the Prime Minister did say that Chamberlain*s speech
was not binding on the British Cabinet,^ and that it was not
necessarily a policy statement, he refused to disavow his
Colonial Secretary*

It is probable that Salisbury knew the

general tenor of his subordinate1s speech before it was deliv
ered, even if fee did not have a cony of the text*

In any

case, the Prime Minister’s failure to disavow Chamberlain’s
speech in nubile demonstrated that what Chamberlain said was
essentially correct— Great Britain desired security through
an alliance*
The world press criticised the belligerent note sounded
by Chamberlain’s Birmingham speech, and even the House of
Commons became the scene of stormy debate*

Although the

Colonial Secretary somewhat modified his views in later public
statements, he still held that 'I £chamber1ain] am perfectly
nA

ready to say now that I desire better relations with Germany.*
" 7 Sarvia, Chaofccrlairu

18

Lanier,
31aloaac.y
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If the Birmingham speech was a public expression of a
British desire for an Anglo--Gorman rapprochementy why did
Germany fail to respond favorably?

One of the reasons lies

in the fact that since Chamberlain had expressed the British
desire for Anglo-German friendship and conceded that Great
Britain could no longer be self-sufficient* there was no
longer any need for Germany to hurry Into an agreement.

The

Reich could continue to follow a policy similar to that which
she had followed in the last months, and she could perhaps
secure a more favorable agreement.
In early June Berlin received the news of the AngloPortuguese negotiations over a possible loan to Portugal in
which Lisbon would use her African colonies as security.

On

June 8 Buelov advised Katrfeldt to determine the view of the
British Government on the alienation of Portuguese colonial
rights or using their rights as a pledge for foreign capital.
England and Germany, as the most interested neighbors of
Portugal,, should cone to an understanding before such an
oi
agreement could be reached.^
On June

H a t e l d t * In a. conference with Lord Salis

bury, protested against a unilateral British loan to Portugal
which used the Portuguese African colonies as security.

The

Prime liinister declared that he did not know the conditions
imposed on Portugal for such a loan and suggested that
21 "Buelov to Katzfeldt," June 8 , 1898, 0. P. XIV
(Part 1), 259-261, no. 3806.

7b
Hatzfel&t discuss the matter with Chamberlain, who was con
ducting the negotiations*.

Salisbury also told Hatzfeldt that

he would inform him of any

steps which the British Govern

ment would take "which might concern the rights or legitimate
pp

interests of Germany in the Portuguese colonies*11

Salis-

bury reminded Hatzfeldt of earlier .Anglo-Portuguese treaties
by which England was bound

'co protect Portugal’s possessions!

because of these treaty obligations Great Britain sought to
prevent the disintegration of the Portuguese empire through
a generous loan*

Hatzfeldt, however, maintained that a

pledge of Portugal1s sovereign rights In her colonies to
Great Britain woul
23
many*

unfavorable impression with Gor-

Hatzfeldt, in requesting authority to discuss possible
German participation in the proposed loan to Portugal, sug
gested that Germany receive Angola as security while reeognlslhg British Interests in .Dalag os. Bay*

Buelow, however,

maintained that Germany would also have to receive the Por
tuguese territory north of the Zambezi, because the pledge
of Delsgo® Bay would deeply affect German public opinion*

^
no.

G*

An

"Salisbury to Gough," June 1H-, 189-8, B. J>*, 1, **8 ,

3006.

^3 "Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,n June l*fs I89S,
XIV (Part 1), 261-262, no* 3807. Raymond Walter Bix-

(Yorkt Pennsylvania* Maple stress Gompanyy±932), pp. XIM— 11p
Hereafter cited as Bixler, Aigglp-GeriBuri laasEialisau

^Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office," June 15, IB98 ,
G* P. XIY (Part 1), 263-26b-, no. 3808*
&gBaaa I m s s X aUas* ?• 115.

Bixler, An.elo-
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additional pled go of territory would help an'-uage the Icss.^
In order to exert additional, pressure for a widening of
participation in the proposed loan, Germany and France brought
up the matter in Lisbon.

Hanotaux, the French .Foreign Minis

ter, was apparently unaware of the German desire to partici
pate in the Loan with England.

He called for an energetic

resistance to the Anglo*Portuguese loan.^6

Count von Tatten-

bach, the German Minister in Lisbon, received instructions to
launch a protest of the loan with the Portuguese king; since
economic considerations involved political factors, he argued,
the proposed loan could not be merely a bilateral arrangement.

2?

On June 20 Buelow received the Information that Alfred
von Rothschild thought the agreement over the proposed loan
was closed.

The Foreign Minister then told Hatsfeldt that

Germany was willing to roach an understanding by sharing the
20
spheres of interest with Great Britain.
The next day Salisbury Informed Ratnfeldt that the Cabinet
had decided that any financial arrangement with Portugal
concerned only that country and England.

Great Britain would

attempt t o maintain the status quo in the Portuguese colonies,
2 5 "Buelow to Hatzfeldt," June
17, 1898, g. P., XIV (Part 1)
Sob, no. 3809. Bixlor, Anglo-Garraaq Hauer ialIsm.~*o■ 115.
26 "Muenster to the Foreign Office," June 19, 1898,
G. P., XIV (Part 1), 268, no. 38W .
2? "Buelow to Tattenbach," June 18, I898, Q. P., XIV
(Port 1), 265-266, no. 3811.
“
28 "Buelow to Hatzfeldt," Juno
20, 1398, G. P., XIT (Part 1)
269, no.3816, Bixler, Angla-aexsan
Irongrlkllanu117.
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but if this were not possible, she would come to an agreement
with Germany over the areas in which the latter had interests*^
Hatzfeldt, however, said the financial question was related to
the colonial question! if the African colonies were used as
security, an agreement was necessary*

Salisbury felt the

German demands for .Angola and northern Mozambique were exces
sive, but at the end of their meeting he did assure Hatzfeldt
that he would not conclude the loan to Portugal before at
tempting to settle the territorial question*^
On June 22, Several, the Portuguese minister, informed
Salisbury that the Kaisar had commanded the Portuguese king
to receive the German minister! at the ensuing meeting T&ttenbach attempted to forestall the Anglo-Portuguesc loan through
diplomatic pressure*

Germany and Portugal could not continue

on friendly terms, the German minister declared, if AngloPortuguese negotiations were carried on without regard for
German interests in the area*

Buelow made similar protests

to the Portuguese Minister in Berlin, and the French minister
at Lisbon also voiced his government* s objection to the pro
posed loan.^
Ihe Gorman actions had placed Great Britain in a most
**Salisbury to Gough,” June 21, 1898 , 2* £., I,
no. 6?.
^ ^Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,** June 21, 1898, G> P.
XIV (Part 1), 270-271, no. 3317. Bixler, MElorOsmmn M t m z l altsrru p. 118-119.
31 “Salisbury to MacDonsll," June 22, 1898, B, D., I,
50, no* 68.
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difficult situation*

Under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese

loan which the two countries had agreed upon, Great Britain
would assume control of Delagoa Bay, the only non-British
entrance into the Transvaal, and t^ouid also assume a voice in
the management of the railway*

Because of the Boer arms

build-up such assurances were necessary*

Should hostilities

commence it m s assumed that England could defeat the Boers,
but if Germany decided to protect her interests it was pos
sible that Great Britain would face a continental alliance.*.
France voluntarily eliminated herself from the discussions
when Belcasse', who replaced Hanotaux at the Foreign Office,
allowed the matter to drop, but Germany still voiced vigorous
opposition to a bilateral Anglo-Portuguese loan..^2, It would
be better to secure an agreement with Germany, perhaps a
pledge to give up all ties in the fransvaal, than to conclude
a loan to Portugal without Germany.

England still could

isolate the Boers, but with German approval.
Salisbury lamely told Several that Germany had .no right
to intervene in a purely financial arrangement, because the
pledge of colonies as security was not an alienation of ter
ritory, but he did not assure the Portuguese minister that
IB
there would be no Anglo-German agreement*"
32 Longer, D ^ o m a e y
Paaers, r, 113-114-.

ImexAaliLaB. It, 533, Holstein

33 "Salisbury to Msic'Donell," Juno 22, 1398, jj. 3., T,
50, no. 68.
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In a dispatch of Jane 22* Buelow further emphasized his
demand in favor of German participation in the loan to Por
tugal.

If England were to extend the loan and seise additional

territory in Africa without consulting Germany
damage is involved not only to German interests*
hut also to the prestige of the Government of His
Majesty . . . . and against this Germany would be
forced to react with energy. Therefore England
will certainly get cheaper out of this by first
agreeing with Germany^ egarding her schemes for
expansion in Africa.-^
On. June .22 Chamberlain sent a telegram to Sir Alfred
Milner, asking him to ascertain the reaction of the Cape
Colony to a cession of Waiflseh Bay to Germany in exchange
for ^commercial control in time of peace and right of oc
cupation in time of war of Delagoa Bay and railway.*1^

The

Colonial Secretary wanted to offer the Bay to Germany* if
Germany would offer her services as an honest broker” in
inducing Portugal to give England, control of Delagoa Bay.
Chamberlain received Milner*s reply the next day* but
it was hardly encouraging,

toy agreement Involving the ces

sion of ilalfisch Bay would adversely affect South African
public opinion.

Both the Cape Colony and Katal, however,

would welcome an increased Interest In Delagoa Bay and the
Cl•»
railway.*"'
3** "Buslovr to "atzfeldt,” Juno 22, 1393, 3. P., I W
(Part 1), 272, no. 3313, Dusdale, 2. J2- 2*> 0 7 , 33-3?.
'’Chamberlain to Milner," -Tune 22, 1898, Kesdilam,
Milner Papers. I, 266. Lang or, ainloraagy o£ Imperialtscu
TT COO
y-O •
"Milner_to Charaborlain," Juno 23, 1398, Headlam,
gasscs,

v, 2 6 7 .
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On. June 23 Hatzfeldt proposed that German and Great
Britain make parallel loans to Portugal* although the amount
which each country contributed did not necessarily have to
be the same*

He also suggested that Great Britain and

Germany agree on the customs revenue which each country should
have as security for their loan.

Gar many would give England

the territory in Mozambique south of the Sambezi* while Ger
many would receive the land north of the Sambozi in addition
to the colony of Angola.

The two nations could only take the

territory If Portugal could not meet her obligations.

Salis

bury said the Germany demands wore too largo* it was Impossibls to roach an agreement on these t e r m s . L a t e r In the
conversation Hatzfeldt hinted that Germany was not the only
power interested in the Anglo-Perfugues© negotiations. Prance
was also Interested in Delagoa Bay because of her colony in
Madagascar.

It would be better* therefore* to divide the

colonies only two ways rather than Include France In the
28
negotiations.
At the same tine Berlin received welcome news from the
German ambassador in St. Petersburg.

He said that Pussia

would not Join France In opposing an Anglo-German agreement
over the Portuguese colonies since Russia had no colonies
in Africa.

This seemed to avert any possible general

i0 » » i

"Salisbury to Sough," .Tune 23, 1393, g.
53, no. 70.

T, Mp-

•U Ibid.. d. 53. "Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,"
June 2 b , 1398, G. P., XIV (Part 1), 277, no. 3819. Bixler,
i££l2.”&£ESa& Impe.rla.lisn. p. 120.

EuroDean clash over the agreement, should France object*

OQ

Great Britain and Portugal continued their discussions
for a loan during the Anglo-German conferences*

At the end

of dune Portugal still sought a sum of 48*000,000*

One fourth

of this amount, to be used for improvements at Lorenzo Marques
and Belagoa Bay, was to be secured on the customs of Mozam
bique*

The rest of the loan would be used to pay the Portu

guese floating debt, and the customs of Portugal herself would
secure this part of the loan*

Salisbury hinted that the ad

vantages to England would not be very great* but Several
pointed out that Great Britain would control'Delagoa Bay and
the railway*.

The Portuguese ambassador also desired that the

arrangements should be made so as to not offend Prance or
Germany*
Count von Tattenbaeh, the Oarman envoy to Lisbon, in
formed the German Foreign Office, on June 30, that the Por
tuguese king had promised to conduct no negotiations for a
loan which included territorial guarantees without first in
forming the German Government*

Germany would also share in

?, -j

such a loan.

With these assurances Germany was able to con

duct her negotiations with England over the Portuguese loan
with renewed vigor*
39 **Tsciiirschkey to the Foreign Off ice,June 23? IB9B,
o. -o. ttv (p-x*t 1), 280, no# 3820. Bixler, Anglo-German
p * 121
^Salisbury to Mae Done 1 1 , June 29? 1898, B* £., I, 53*

XVT (Part 1 ;, 281* no. 3*521.

.Dugdaie, &• u. d* j xiij 3
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Despite the apparent acceptance of Germany in the nego
tiation, some in the British bureaucracy still questioned the
advisability of an. agreement with Germany.

Sir Francis Bertie,

one of the undersecretaries in the British Foreign Office,
warned against the possible consequences of German participa
tion in the loan.

If Germany should take part in the negoti

ations, Dolagoa Bay might become an international matter.
Besides, he argued, mere proximity to Portuguese colonies in
Africa did not give Germany the right to participate in the
negotiations.
IlO
colonies?

Did not France also border on the Portuguese

Salisbury and Chamberlain both saw the value of an
understanding with Germany, but neither appreciated the pres
sure which that country placed on Lisbon.

The Colonial

Secretary urged Portugal to resist the encroachments of Ber
lin and Paris Into her private business*

He wanted Britain

and Portugal first to males their arrangements because he was
nafraid that If the present opportunity [to conclude the loanQ
is allowed to pass It may never recur.

Apparently the

Colonial Secretary wanted to make one further effort to con
clude an agreement with Portugal before the Anglo-German
negotiations progressed any further.
^2 HKemorandnri by Its. Bertie,n June 3D, 1898, £. D., I,
no. 72. The French Congo bordered on Kabinda, a Por
tuguese possession north of the Congo* The Congo Free State
also had a border common with Angola*
if3 Chamber lain to Several,11 July h 7 1398, Garvin,
‘ '
III, 312.

On July 6 Salisbury and Hatzfeldt again conferred over
the question of the loan to Portugal.

The Prime Minister in

dicated that fee was willing to come to an agreement* he had
several proposals.

He asked Hatzfeldt whether Germany would

give up her extra-territoriality in Zanzibar.

He also felt

that the situation in the Iberian Peninsula was too unclear
M |,

to permit the two powers to pursue a definite plan.

The

United States had Just defeated the Spanish fleet at Santiago,
and the Portuguese were becoming more sensitive to foreign
Interference In their colonial possessions.

At the same time

Great Britain received added impetus for settling the question
of Delagoa Bay.
On July 6 Sir Alfred Milner oreseated his general views
of South Africa to the Colonial Secretary*

Be felt the situ

ation with the Transvaal in South Africa was becoming quite
serious and doubted if r,we [the British] shall ever be mas
ters without a war•*
' If Great Britain could secure Delagoa
Bay in exchange for Walfisch Bay, he felt that most people
fVit!i reasonable open mindsn would agree.

Failure to gain

Delagoa Boy could be disastrous to the British interests in
'•VVC 4 *V y /■* Y * vs

W* ••*"trV 1tfr + At

f'

-i <*«iw U*

*1
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The possession of Delayoa Bay is the best chance
we [.the Britlslf) have of winning the great game
between ourselves and the Transvaal for the mas
tery In South Africa without a war. . . .
The
overwhelming preponderance in wealth and oppor**** ftHatsfslcit to the Foreign Office,!* July 6, 1893. £. P.,
HIT (Part 1), 201, no. 3023. Dugdale, G. ,0. rj., ill, 35.
Bixler,
I i m l s l l S B ? P* 121.

tunity on the side of the Transvaal may turn the
scale against us* unless ve have cone means to
bring very effective pressure to bear upon that
country*
This ominous warning vac further proof for those in the British
Foreign and Colonial Offices who" wanted a quick agreement.
Hatzfeldt* on July 9* urged an immediate understanding
between Germany and Ingland.

Trance* according to the German

ambassador* was spreading rumors that Portugal had already
concluded an agreement with Gangland over the coastal ter
ritories.

This* because of the.influence on Portuguese

public opinion* could permanently disrupt negotiations for the
loan.

Hatzfeldt wanted both Germany and England to partici

pate in the loan; if the Portuguese were unable to continue
In possession of their colonies* the customs duties which
each country managed would indicate that country’s tentative
k6
claims to the Portuguese possessions.
As a result of his conversation

with Hatzfeldt * the

Prime 'Minister came to the opinion that William wanted an
agreement with England* but he fH?as taking the opportunity to
ky
make larger demands than he was prepared to press*" ' They
had stated that Germany wanted Great Britain to give up
Angola and her rights along the Shire Fiver.

If Britain

refused the latter* Germany would accept the British part of
E l i n o r to C h s u a b s rla in ,u J u ly V

1398, Headlaai,

iiti&SE 2fia££fi., 1, 267-268.
Lh6 11Galls;bury to Gon-h," July 9, 1398, B. B., 1, 55,

no. 7k.

8*f
the Samoan and Tonga islands.

In addition to this* Hatzfeldt

called for the Portuguese half of Timor in the East Indies.
Salisbury said the British public would never allow the ces
sion of any territory along the Shire River* since missionaries
had first explored and developed the region.

The British Prime

Minister agreed to consider the request for Portuguese Timor*

although he privately -confessed that he did not know why Oarmany was interested in the area.

Salisbury made a. counter

proposal in which he said he would be willing to give up
Walfisch Bay to Germany* JX Germany would cede the whole of
Togoland to Great Britain***9

He knew Hatzfeldt would not

accept this proposal.
On July 13 Salisbury and Hatzfeldt again discussed the

proposed loan to Portugal.

The British Prime Minister sug

gested that Great Britain receive Portuguese Mozambique south
of the Zambezi* Including Delag oa Bay and the railway* and the
province of Angola north of the town of Bglto* as security
for a loan*

Germany would receive the northern cart of Mozam

bique and Portuguese Angola south of Bgito.

While both powers

sought to maintain the integrity of the Portuguese colonial
empire* if Portugal would disease of her colonies* the powers

making the loans would have a. pre-emptive right In the areas
where they secured the interest on the customs h o u s e s . ^
Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 31!-k
'Hatzfeldt to the
Fore is® Office, Tuly'tf, 1393, G. P., XIV (Part 1), 238-289,

no. 3827.
Garvin, loc. clt.
V ‘'Salisbury to Gough," July 13 , 1898, B. 0., I, 56-57,
no* 7 5 * ^Katzfeldt to Foreign O f f i c e J u l y XJ* lB$ 8 y G. P.*
(Part 1)* 293-29*+1 no* 3331* BlxXer* A&gIo-German Imperialism*
pp. 123-12**.

On the same day that Salisbury announced his proposals
to the German ambassador, the Portuguese minister announced
that his country had decided in favor of the status quo and
against any idea of a loan from Great Britain or any other
government*

This also would include any change of states
51
in the Portuguese African colonies*
Portugal would at5?
tempt to secure sufficient funds on her home revenues*

Salisbury informed Several that Britain would strongly op
pose any proposal for international control which any of the
major powers might make* ^

Should Delagoa Bay fall into the

hands of an unfriendly power, the Transvaal could continue to
secure additional supplies and armaments for use against
Great Britain*
Lord Salisbury blamed the influence of France in Por
tugal for the failure of the proposed loan.

Hatzfeldt even

thought the French action could lead to an internationaliza
tion of Delagoa Bay.^4* The Prime Minister, of course, wanted

to avoid this at all costs*

Salisbury and Hatzfeldt contin

ued their discussions over the proposed loan, despite the Por
tuguese decision, because neither felt that Portugal could be
come financially stable without assistance from abroad*
^ ^Salisbury to MaeBonell,!t July 13, 1893, B. D., I,
57, no. 76*
^

^Chamberlain 1s Memorandum of Bis Interview with Several,

July 15, 1898, Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 313*
53 Bixier, ti££l2-2ssaaa isa§£iali3&» ?• 12*+.

^
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The British Cabinet agreed to the German demand for Por
tuguese Timor, but it refused to consider the German request
for Samoa or Tonga because of the opposition of Australia*
Germany would have to make large concessions, such as Togoland, in order to receive Half!seh Bay*

The Gorman ambas

sador expressed his regret at the British demands, and he
said he felt the negotiations might come to an end*

Hatzfeldt

again threatened to turn to Russia because, In Salisbury 1 s
words, 5<in the position occupied by Germany, she fGermanyJ
could not stand alone#112?

Hatzfeldt had often repeated this

threat during the course of his conversations with Salisbury,

but the Prime Minister did not take it seriously*
Although Hatzfeldt expressed his disappointment over the

negotiations and suggested that Germany might turn elsewhere,
Germany wanted a quick conclusion of the agreement over the

Portuguese loon*

The Empress Frederick, in a letter to her

mother, stated that Chamberlain1s statements had made a
favorable impression on the .Kaiser and that he urgently desired
an agreement with E n g l a n d . G r e a t Britain also wanted to
continue the negotiations, and the British ambassador in
Berlin told Baron von Richthofen, a Foreign Office official,
that he thought England would concede more than it seemed at
that time and that it was still possible that Germany would
55 "Salisbury to GoujrU,» July 20, 1398, B. D., I, 58-59,
no. 78.

8?
receive Walfiscli Bay* 5ia.noa, and northern Angola*^
On July 27 Hatzfeldt renewed the discussions over the
proposed loan to Portugal and the spheres of influence each
country would receive if the loan were made*

The German am**

offered Britain the customs receipts of Mozambique
south 03? the Zambesi} including Delagoa

Bay

and the railway*

and the portion of Angola between the 12th parallel (Egito)
and the 7th parallel (Leiundo River)*

Germany would administer

the part of Mozambique north of the Zambesi and the remaining
portions of Angola*

(See Map III* p* 88}*

Hatsfeldt did not

mention Samoa or Portuguese Timor nor did Salisbury bring up
the question of extra-territoriality of Zanzibar at this
meeting.

The German ambassador felt that an equal loan by

both Germany and Great Britain would not be suitable* sines
g0
the major Portuguese harbors were in the British spheres*
The .Prime Minister said he did not third: it vis© for Germany
to secure the Portuguese territory north of the Zambezi and
west of the Shire5 if Germany would receive this* she would
almost surround the British settlements along the Shire*^
Hatzfeldt repeated the desire for maintaining the territorial
integrity of Portugal but requested that the two powers bind

themselves together not to recognize any alienation of ter
ritory to "any power except to the one to whom the revenues
V"Richthofen to Eulenburg, July 2*f, IS 9S, £.
XIV
(Part 1), 333 » no. 3839 . Bixler, .Anglo-German Imperialism, p. 126.
58 Bixler, loc. cit.. p. 121.
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were assigned#11

In the next conference between Salisbury and Hatzfeldt
over the loan to Portugal, the Gorman ambassador sought ad
ditional compensation for having been deprived of the region
north of the Zambezi and vest of the Shire.

Vlhen Salisbury

suggested that Germany extend her claim in Portuguese Angola,
Hatzfeldt proposed that the northern boundary between the
British and German spheres of influence be moved south from
the 7th to the 8th parallel#

This would adequately compen

sate Germany for any loss in Mozambique*

Salisbury also sug

gested that Britain be assigned warehouse space at the mouth
of the Congo Elver, since Germany would control this sphere*
Hatzfeldt offered several minor suggestions which Salisbury
approved, "subject to the condition that they were accepted
by Portugal."62
Hatzfeldt reported on August 8 that Salisbury did not
want to seem in Lisbon as an "expectant heir," dividing her
property before she desired to part with it*

As a result

Salisbury declared that he wanted only to make public the
loan to Portugal; the two powers would place all points
regarding the transfer of colonies in a secret agreement*
Hatzfeldt agreed and suggested that if the proposed trans
fer of colonies were made known, IGrance might cite the Anglo"Salisbury to Lascellos," July 27, 1898, D. D., X,

599 no* 79.
"Salisbury to Lascolles," August 3, 1898, B* 0* >
60, no* 80*
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German agreement an a precedent and conclude a similar agree
ment with Spain.^

Hatnfeldt objected to Salisbury*s an

nouncement that he was going on leave and that Balfour would
continue the negotiations!

the participants would lose too

much time because of the change.

He did feel, however, that

Balfour had been !llionest and forthcoming11 during the previous
Gktime he represented Salisbury* ■
On August 10 Sir Francis Bertie submitted another memo
randum to the Foreign Office in which he questioned the value
of an agreement with Germany*

England, argued Bertie, already

had rights in Delagoa Bay by a previous agreement with Por
tugal and would gain little under the terms of the proposed
agreement*

Several had strongly opposed the agreement, and

there was doubt whether Portugal would accept a loan which
included Anglo-German co-operation.

Bertie pointed out that

Germany was "not likely to risk a quarrel or even an estrange
ment with Bussla for our [^British] benefit unless we guarantee
her against France and Russia*1* If Germany thought more of
taking possession of her security than maintaining the Por
tuguese empire, this might "raise a question of our ^England*sj
treaty obligations and cause the quarrel which we are seeking
to avoid, f|6?
^3 "Hat&feldt to the Foreign Off ice," August 8, 1898,
G.
XI? (Part 1), 3X6* no. 381*8, DugdaXe, g. £.
, III,
316. Bixler, Ang 1 o-Gar man Imperialism. p* 127a* £*» loc. cit.. Dugdale, G. £.

ioc. clt.

^ "Memorandum by Mr. Bertie,'1 August 10, 1898, B. I).,
x, 60*“6i, no.
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Salisbury also expressed some apprehension over German
designs in South Africa, although he still desired to reach
a n ug re amen t *

In a

let uar to vue ■yuo an, th q I'x'Ime i■
ijln i.&x>e r

declared that the British Government is
vary anxious to make it clear that we desire to
keep the Portuguese monarchy upright; and to pro
tect her in the possession of her colonies, so
long as there is no revolution at Lisbon, and the
monarchy remains standing. Germany professes the
same desire* but we are not quite so sure of her
sincerity*55
During their conference of August 11, Hatzfeldt and
Balfour assured each other of the desire of their govern
ments to maintain the Portuguese colonial empire*

They dis

cussed once again the limits of their respective interests
In Angola.

At the end of the conversation Hatzfeldt left

his unofficial suggestions for a treaty between the two
countries.

Great Britain and Germany would provide either a

common loan or parallel loans to Portugal on the customs of
Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Timor.

The governments

were to pledge £8,000,000, but the suggestions did not state
the amount of each government1s share*

England would re

ceive the customs of Mozambique south of the Sambezi and a
central portion of Angola, while Germany would receive northern
Mozambique, the rest of .Angola., and Portuguese Timor
On August 12 Richthofen urged Hatzfeldt to lose no time
^ “Salisbury to Queen Victoria,“ August 10, 1898, 0. T. L«,
3rd series, III, 263-26^.
“Memorandum, Communicated Unofficially by Hatzfeldt,11
August 11, 1898, J|* J2>, I, 62-63, Enclosure in no. 82*

in the negotiations.

He informed the ambassador that France

had rejected a Portuguese attempt to secure a loan because
of insufficient guarantees; this was an indication, according
to Richthofen, that France also sought territorial guarantees•
Nfhere can be no doubt as to the urgent character of the Por
tuguese need of money, f'
f he declared, tfthe only question is
whether 'France or England and Germany give it.
On August 18 Balfour, in two unofficial declarations, out
lined his plan for the final settlement of the proposed loan.
Great Britain would provide two-thirds of the loan and Ger
many one-third.

The former would receive southern Mozambique

and the Blantyre region along the Shire Biver.

In Angola.

Britain would receive the area
north of Egito to the line passing from Imbriz to
the intersection of the 8th parallel of south
latitude with the l6tb degree of longitude east
of Greenwich thence descending that degree to the
9th parallel of latitude and following that paral
lel eastward as far as the Congo Free State. y
Germany was assigned the rest of Mozambique and the ter
ritory south of Bgito and north of the line running from
Amferiz.^

The two countries would also oppose the entrance

of a third power
either by way of loan to Portugal on the security
of the revenues of those provinces, or by way of
acquisition of territory, by grant, cession, purRichthofen to Hatzfeldt,ft August 12, 1898, G. P.,
XI? (Part 1), 317, no. 3850. Dugdal©, &*. £* 2.,
37.
69 Unofficial Draft Declarations, Balfour to Hat 2feldt,,T August 18, 1898, 2* D*, I, 6h~65, Enclosure X in no. 83
7 0 2 U L&.
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chase, lease or otherwise* 71
Richthofen, In commenting on Balfour*s statement, declared
that rtan arrangement without Timor is unacceptable to us.”
wIn our eyas,*'1 declared Richthofen, ”the agreement
tugal

over Per72
was the starting point of a joint colonial policy.”

The Marquis da Several conversed with Balfour on August
19 over the possible participation of Germany in the For*
tu.guese loan.

He thought that Portugal would negotiate the

loan with Great Britain, who in turn would make an arrange
ment with Germany.

Balfour, however, said it would he in

the interacts of everyone to include Germany in the loan.

It

would he ^inexpedient” to borrow solely from Great Britain;
that country would also frown on Portugal^ borrowing from
other powers because of the danger of international controls;
the only other possible alternative would be a parallel loan
from Great Britain and Germany.

Several intimated that he

thought the arrangement was all right, and Balfour promised
to contact the Portuguese minister If he concluded a final
nr *5

agreement with G e r m a n y . B a l f o u r did not, however, tell
Several about the customs agreements.
By August 20 the German ambassador In London was able
to say that the question of Timor was settled; he gave full
credit for the Inclusion of Timor,

in the German sphere of

^ U n of fi ci al Draft Declarations, Balfour to Hatzfeldt,11
August 18, I898, J3. D., I, 6W>5, Enclosure 2 in no. 83.
xrsr

"Balfour
73 Balfour to Thornton,” .August 18, 1893, g. JJ., I, 66,
no. c

9k
influence to Balfour, who
7k
the nso otiations•

**va*g@n

tly*' desired a conclusion of

On August 22 .Balfour and Hatzfeldt discussed one of the
last major problems which separated them from a final agree
ment.

Sine© Great Britain already held pre-emptive rights at

Beingoa Bay,, it was possible that she could acquire special
privileges there,

Batsfoldt declared that German public opin

ion would be aroused if Great Britain would gain advantages
in her area and Germany would not make similar gains.

He pro

posed that Great Britain could not gain any advantage in
Delagoa Bay ^unless and until Germany acquired similar advan
tages in the region to which she was prepared, under the agree
ments, to confine her i n t e r e s t s * B a l f o u r suggested that
if either country obtained and exorcised privi
leges not contemplated by the Agreements, it
should abstain from objecting to the other
country obtaining and exorcising similar privi
leges, it being of course understood that the
privileges were in every case to be confined to
the regions in which the two Powers were respec
tively^ interested under the terms of the Agree
ment .^
On August 2b Buolow and the Emperor agreed to the proffHatsfeldt to the Foreign Office,n August 20, 1893,
P., XXV (Part 1), 328, no. 3860. Dugdale, £. D. D., III,
38* In a typical Wilhelmian letter, the Kaiser wrote that un
less the negotiations led to a more satisfactory result, nth.e
continued presence of my Ambassador in London would be super
fluous just now.” Dugdale G. B. D., III, 38. See -also HLascelles to Balfour,*1 August 22, lcl9o, B. £• 5 1,68-69, no. 87.
75 "Balfour to XasoellQS," August 22, 1398, R. 0., T,
69-70, no. 88.
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posal to join Britain in opposing the intervention of a
rjry

third roarer In South Africa..,

but Holstein warned that the

agreement should only apply to matters in South .
v-j.r s.ea •

H

Germany supported England against Russia in the Far East,
Russia would aid France in South Africa in an attempt to
78
secure territory from Germany and England.
Balfour also
saw the Anglo-German agreement as a local alliance in a
letter to the Queent
He [BalfourJ hopes that an arrangement may be come
to, not disadvantageous to Portugal, which will ce
ment the friendship between the country and the
German Empire, and will indeed amount to a positive
alliance so far as South Africa is concerned*79
By August 28 the two negotiators had agreed on all
ports of the treaty, and they submitted copies to their
Governments for approval*

A last mi mite effort by Sir

Francis Bertie to change the border in Angola which gave
gO
Bgito to Germany failed,
and the two powers signed the
convention, a secret convention, and a note (see Appendix
A, p* 117) on August 30, 1898*
77 *«Buelow to the Emperor,” August 2hf 1898, G. 2*, XVI
(Part 1), 3^0, no* 3S67. hug&ale, fi. 2* 2* > -^9 3«-39.
7^ “Memorandum by Holstein,n August 26, 1898, G. £*,
XIV (Part 1), 3 ^ 2 - no. 3867* Bixler, Aiklo-ilermaii
allam* pp. 132-133* tfDie englische Panserflotte koenne nlcht
ein Dorf an der langgestrackten deutschen Qstgrenze schuetsen,11
declared the Kaiser on August 21, Meinecke, Buandnisorobiem*
p. 105*
79 «Balfour to Queen Victoria,rf August 26, 1898, 0* V. L.,
3rd series, III, 266.
rtHatzf©ldt to the Foreign Office,H August 28, 1898,
G. P., XIV (Part 1), p. 3lf5-3'f6, no. 3870* Bixler, AneXoP- 133.
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The Convention between Germany and England provided
that the two governments would simultaneously Issue loans to
Portugal on favorable terns on the security of the customs
revenue of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor*

Britain

would be assigned the customs revenues of Mozambique south
of the Zambezi and the part of that province north and west
of the conflux of the Zambezi and the shire5

in addition to

this she would receive the central portion of .Angola (see
Map r/, p.

97)* Germany would receive the customs of the

remaining portions of Mozambique and Angola, plus Portu
guese Timor*

The delegates sent Into the customs area by

each country would only have the right of collection, not
of administration, unless ther q w a s a default on the payment
of Interest*
The secret convention suggested that it may prove Im
possible to maintain the Portuguese colonies*

The two powers

also agreed to oppose jointly a third power If it attempted
to lend money on the security of the Portuguese colonies*
The secret note provided that If one of the partici
pating parties should receive a special concession from Por
tugal, the act would. nnot become operative until analogous
grants as near as possible of ecu&l value have been accorded
to the other Government*11
As the representatives of Germany and Great Britain
signed the Conventions of August 30, they assured each other
of their desire to maintain the Portuguese empire.

But the
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ink had not long boon, dry on the documents when it became
apparent that unforeseen developments might endanger the
realisation of the agreements, and Germany saw the possibil
ity that she may have given up too much in order to "maintain
the Portuguese Empire."

Daring the course of the negotiations leading tip to the
settlement of August 3$, there was a question of whether to
inform Portugal of the final settlement.

Salisbury had dis

cussed the possible Anglo-German collaboration over the loan
with Several, but he had not informed th© Portuguese ambas
sador of any territorial guarantees.

.After the two countries

signed the agreement, both Germany and Great Britain agreed to
inform Portugal of the .Convention, but they decided to refrain
from revealing the secret Convention.
that the Convention

Balfour assured Several

which Germany and England signed “was

quite as much for the interests of Portugal as for those of
the other Powers concerned.
On August 30, despite the secrecy of the agreement, news
papers in both Germany and England began to carry stories
that the two countries had concluded important arrangements
which would drastically alter their relationship with each
other.

The Pall Mall Gazette began a series of articles on

the suspected agreement which extended to 11an offensive and
p
defensive alliance In certain eventualities
German news^ irBaXfour to Several, ’* August 31, IB98, 13. JJ., I, 75,
no. 93.
2 Hale, lhib.JXci.tv and Mplemacv. p. 176. Hue low thought
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papers joined the discussion with arguments ranging from in
formation that the two countries had signed an alliance to
a complete refutation of any change of policy*

The Koeln-

fsqhq get turn? dented that Germany had changed her objectives*
but that did not eliminate possible agreement on a specific
question, such as *a joint loan to Portugal whose needy
3
financial condition may sooner or To,tor require such action*1
The general picture of the Anglo-German Convention gradu
ally was pieced together from various sources.

^Dlplomaticus,**

who was perhaps Lncien Wolf, presented the basic outline of
the agreement in an article in the October issue of The Portnightly Ea?lew. "Most people are satisfied," he declared,
"that, in some way or another* the agreement Is concerned
with a transference of Delagoa, Bay to England,** but the agree
ment covered a such wider scopes
The new Anglo-German Agreement is, in fact, an
arrangement, resulting fro® certain negotiations
with Portugal, by which the two great Powers
divide between them a right of pre-emption in re
gard to all the Portuguese colonies in Africa*
It
defines the territorial spheres of each of the two
contracting Powers in those colonies, provides for
the consideration to be paid as and when the colo
nies are alienated by Portugal * * *^
-he Berliner Tpgehlatt also printed a reasonably accurate
summary of the Convention which its Lisbon correspondent had
England had released news of the agree®ont to the press* Bee•
TtBuelow to Katsfeldt,*1 September 3, 1898, G* £♦, XIV (Part 1),
359, no* 3876* Dug dale, G. 2*
IVI, 39-*$*
3 Hale,
and Diplomacy* p. 1?6.
k
HDiplomatlens,rf !tTh© Anglo-German Agreement ,
nightly Be.vlQM I3CI7 (October 1898), 627, 629.
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TJ.ie Fort-
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received from Portuguese authorities.

Ho one* however* dis

covered the extent of each country*s share of Portugalfs
colom.es*
Some German newspapers accepted the agreement as a sign
of improved Ang1o-Gorman relations* while others strongly
condemned it because It had given complete control of South
.Africa to Britain,

Despite the feeling in official circles

that Germany had received adequate compensation* organ.'sat Ions
such as the Pan-German 'League and the Colonial Society issued
protests against the ,?fbetrayal of III,ed,er&eut sch torn.”u
The German Government defended Its position in a series
of unofficial telegrams which appeared anonymously in a num
ber of German newspapers.

Since Great Britain already had an

option on Delagoa Bay* Germany could not have orevented her
from securing the valuable port,

liith the agreement Germany

would receive valuable compensation In the Portuguese colonies|
without the agreement Germany would hove received nothing*

As

for the question of abandoning the Boers* the Government pointed
out that Germany had to provide for her com welfare.

7

The proceedng statement is norhaos the best argument which
hxbl.lc.ity and Diplomacy. p. 177* Sir Edvard
Grey declared that the harquis do Several was even acquainted
with the Secret Agreement* ** lie Several had toown all about
the negotiations and the signature of the 1Secret* Agreement*
and had made no secret to Lord Salisbury of his knowledge of
It,” Tlscomrt Grey* fweptv-fivc Years, 1893-19.16 0!ev Yorks
Yredoriclc A* Stakes Company* 192^,
W*
^ Halo, lee. cit.* pp, 177-178.
7 a,ij„

p. 179.
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can be advanced in favor of German participation in the pro
posed loan to Portugal in 1898*

Germany had strongly sup

ported Kruger in 1896$ Germany abandoned Kruger in 1898*
Vets a definite break in German policy*

This

While most of the mem-

bars of the German Government would not have sent such an in
flammatory dossago after the capture of Jameson, all had recog
nised the value of the South African Republic to German as
pirations#

Heavy German interests in banking, industry, and

mining necessitated strong official interest.

The Kruger

Government invested large sums in light and heavy armaments,
and it seemed that the demand would continue *

German had sup

plied almost all the weapons which the Boers used; France was
a poor second*

It therefore seams strange that B u e l w would

have abandoned the Boers in 1898 by completely renouncing all
interests in southern Africa.

The head of the Foreign Of

fice, in discussing his actions preceding the outbreak of the
Boer War, declared in his memoirs %
I was determined from the first to keep us clear
of any steps for the Boers and against1the British.
I felt the more justified in this in that for
months' past, ♦ # * I * * . had ©specially urged
President Kruger, to go cautiously and eon©iliatorily to work, and had left not the slightest room for
any doubt in the minds of the loers that . . * they
must not count on receiving any help from us.
Thera was, however, a deep underlying motive In back of Ger
many1s change of policy, a motive which Is not discussed in
Buelow,s notoriously inaccurate memoirs.
8 Rue-low, Ifoiso-lrs. I, 3^2.

10.3
In 1897 the Transvaal Government set up a commission of
inquiry into the partial collapse of the gold “lining boom*
Many of the principal Gorman banking interests, such as
Goerts, the representative for the Deutsche Bqnfe. openly
criticised the Boers and began to refuse funds to them.

A

number of industries whose market in the Transvaal primarily
depended upon mining .aligned themselves with the Deutsche
Bank; German newspapers, such as the Koe.i'al.scIie_ Se.ltnns and
the N-orddeufcacha Alliiemalnc

also began to turn
9
against the Boers, Has xx xnsp i.red from above.M
The German
consul at Pretoria declared that he had to defend himself
against both the German banking interests and Rhodes at the
same time and expressed his fear that Portugal, having re
jected Kruger*s offer of financial assistance, would turn to
Britain for help and lose her colonies*

The banking Interests

did not want the latter to occur, and thus they also took
an active interest in the settlement ox Portugal*s finan
cial problems.

Among the leaders in this policy was the

Dagmstae.dtar Bank * In which William himself had a personal
Interest."-'
The Anglo-German Agreement went Into effect immediately
after Hatzfeldt and Balfour signed it on August 39, but it
soon became apparent that the problem of the Portuguese
colonies had not been solved*

On September 1 Hatzfoldt told

^ .Anderson, Anti-English. Feeling * pp. 270-271.
10 laid., p p . 271-272.

Balfour that, according to German Information, Portugal was
sounding out France on the possibility of a loan5

Lisbon would

rather have a French loan than Anglo-German parallel agree
ments.

Since France had Indicated that she would not be

able to give an answer to Portugal#s request until October 1,
Germany and Great Britain would have a month to convince
Several to accept the general views of the two governments.
Salisbury, In. a minute to the report of this conversation,
bitterly added that Germany wanted to rfforce the pace of destiny*11 Great Britain could give no assurances to Germany of
compliance to her request because Great Britain did not know
what sort of financial terms Germany would give Portugal*
Besides, added Salisbury, since Britain already had free right
of pre-emption on the east coast of Africa, a French loan
11
would pose no threat to Great Britain.
The next day Balfour wrote that open negotiations with
France on the part of Portugal "would lead to serious com
plications1* because of previous arrangements.

Lisbon could

not borrow from any country on the security of Belagoa Bay
other than Great Britain because,
agreement of 1891.

of the Anglo-Portuguese

If Portugal wanted a large loan, however,

she had to mortgage her most valuable property, B©lago& Bay|
In order to secure such a loan, she had to come to an agree
ment with the newly-formed Anglo-German combination.

Portugal

HBalfour to Lascalles," September 1, 1898, £• |J., 1,
75-76, no. 91**

1

p

seamed unable to avoid the Anglo-German parallel loans*
Even Salisbury5 who had become greatly concerned over the
French interests in the Portuguese colonies and the possible
effects on the Anglo-German agreement, began to exert some
pressure in favor of the loan*

He agreed to discuss the mat

ter with Several and to rtintimate to him that any loan from
France must not be secured on the customs of Angola*
In early October the British Prime Minister reported
that French sources had offered Portugal a loan of 1.6,000,000
if that country would allow a French controlled company to
administer her railway revenues, would earmark a greater por
tion of Portuguese customs for debt conversion, and would
agree to the formation of an Issue Committee to supervise
Portuguese finances*

Salisbury declared his opposition to

any form of joint guarantee or control of Portuguese finik
ances and the plan failed to materialise*
By early November the proposed loan appeared to be no
closer to fulfillment than when the two powers signed the
agreement.

The German Imperor, however, appeared delight

ed with the agreement and referred to it as the corner
stone of an alliance between the two powers*

He even In

formed his mother that he had reached a full understanding
with England, although this statement also proved to b©
“Salisbury to Lascelles," September 9, 1898, B. £*,
I, 78, no. 97.
^ “Salisbury to 10300.
1103,“ October 3, I898, 2*
I, 78-79, no. 99*
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1^
fantasy* '
On Hoverabor

5 Several, in a eonforenee with Salisbury,

informed the British Prime Minister of further negotiations
between his government and France*

He outlined the limita

tions which Portugal had agreed to place on the loan* and
Salisbury concluded that ,ftho financial measures taken by
Portugal for dealing with her creditors are a matter entirely
for her own d e c i s i o n * H e apparently at this meeting did
not attem.pt to convince the Portuguese minister of the ad
visability of an Anglo-German loan* although he again narrowed
the possible alternatives to such an arrangement,

Salisbury

accepted the idea of a French loan to Portugal, hut he op
posed any mention of other Portuguese territory, such as the
A sores* as security for the loan— French influence could be
come too strong in these regions.

Great Britain was bound by

a treaty to protect Portugal from attack, but she would not
do this if the Portuguese would modify the treaty by aliena
ting territory to France.
On January 11, 1399, Several reported to Salisbury that
he felt the efforts to raise a loan in Paris would prove un
successful because of German opposition to such .a loan.

The

Prime Minister attempted to reassure Several about German
lff Sidney Ties, Kina Sdward III, 4 Biography
The Macmillan Company, 1925), il7739*

(Hew Borki

^ "Salisbury to Bac'lonell," November 7> 1898, £. J>.» I
79, no. 100.
U "Biggs to Queen Victoria," December 25, 1898, 0 . V. 4 * ?
3rd scries, III, 322-323.
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designs and suggested that countries other than Portugal had
attempted to raise loans in Paris and had failed.*^ Later a
Portuguese financial agent attempted to raise a loan in Lon
don, hut when he was unsuccessful, he again turned to Paris.
This time he was successful*
Hie Lisbon Government had planned to use its 72,000
debentures of the Portuguese Royal Railway valued at 48^0,000
for the Berne Award, but it finally mortgaged them through
some French financiers for 4500,000.

The contract provided

that if the debentures were not redeemed before the time ex
pired, Prance could have the option of retaining them at a

specified price*

The British hintstor in If sbon, Sir Hugh

MacDonall, saw the danger of France gaining control of the
Portuguese railway system and urged his Government to con
vince a private British firm to advance the money to Lisbon.
tfIt would be a political roaster-strobe,Jf and Greet Britain
would acquire a voice in the aim'nlstratlon of the railways,

19

nothing came of this suggestion.
The Portuguese ambassador reported on June 7, 1399,
that tha financial picture in Portugal was improving and that
Portugal would probably not need a loan at that tine.

Several,

however, did express a fear that either Germany or France
ailght send Portugal an ultimatum demanding the institution
iG
" "Salisbury to .MacDonoll," January 11, 1899, 5* 2.,
X, 82, no. 106.
19 m-facDonolX to Bertie, ?# Aoril 20, 1399«» fi* I>., X,

83-#*, no. 108.
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of a control over Portugal^ customs in order to pay the
creditors of their own country.

The British Prime Minister

declared that Great Britain would oppose such interference

P0

in p or tugal1s finane os* ~

The Anglo-*German discussions had originally been made
necessary as a. result of the German, threat to the British
position in. South Africa*

Tensions between Great Britain

and the Transvaal continued to mount in the summer of 1899,
but Britain still had not closed the South African Republic *s
last non-British link with the outside world*

The Anglo-

German agreement had effectively eliminated the latter from
all connections with the Transvaal, as Bngland had intended,
but the Boers could still purchase arms from other sources
and import them through Delagoa Bay.

Salisbury emphasized

the value of Delagoa Bay and warned Portugal against any
change of policy over the Portuguese ports ?,IIer Majesty*s
Government could not regard, the transfer of the control

of

Delagoa Bay

to a foreign. Power as otherwise than an impi
frxendly act. n'~
The German minister in. Lisbon, in the middle of July,

achnowleged that, "for the moment,” the Anglo-German loan
P2
to Portugal was cut of the question.**
On many occasions
2® ^Salisbury to I-facDonell,n June 7, 1899, B. 2- , x,
8h*, no. 109*
”Salisbury to MacDonoll,” June 17, 1899, £* 2*, -~5
85, no. 110.
22 JtMaeDonell to Salisbury,” disnatched July 22, 1899,
B. D-, x? 87, no. 112.
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Several had expressed apprehensions over German designs on
the Portuguese colonies* and Great Britain was able to take
advantage of Germany’s position outside of Portugal’s con
fidence to conclude an agreement with Lisbon which was in
spirit completely opposed to the toglo-German agreement of
August 30, 1093.
In a meeting with Several on September 13, Salisbury
urged Portugal to prevent the flow of arms to the Transvaalf
this would be.advantageous for Great Britain, and Portugal
would not have to become involved in hostilities with the
Transvaal•

Soveral, however, declared that Portugal could

not remain neutral if war broke out between Great Britain and
the Transvaal§ she would join Great Britain, who could then
use the Delagoa Bay Railway and mount an offensive from all
sides*

fh© Portuguese minister even said he had been ©m~
PR
powered to sign such an alliance.
Several’s proposal immediately put Salisbury on the
defensive.

Since Germany and England had agreed to inform

the other Government if it received special privileges,and
were bound to “use its influence to obtain for the other
Government similar special privileges of an occasional char
acter and of equal value,** Portugal’s participation on the
side of Great Britain would require compensation for Germany*
England could not allow Germany to take her ally’s territory
“Salisbury to MacDonell,” September 13, 1899, B* £•,
I, 88, no* 113*
*"*
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because Lisbon had assisted in the war against the Boers*
The British minister in Lisbon said he felt the Portuguese
disliked the Anglo-German agreement so such that they would
2*f
try to destroy It through an Anglo-Portuguesa pact*
Al
though Salisbury did say that he wanted Portugal to agree to
declare war against the Transvaal on British invitation?
he clearly sought to avoid Portuguese participation.

Even

neutrality would be unacceptable, because the British Ad
miralty pointed out that a Portuguese declaration of neutral
ity In the event of war would prevent British ships from
coaling at Delagoa Bay.
Salisbury sought an agreement with Portugal which would
give Great Britain the opportunity to block arms shipments to
the Transvaal and assure a coal supply for the British navy
and still not violate the Anglo-German agreement*

The Prime

Minister suggested that Soveral !finsert in the note we pro
pose to sign that Portugal will not * in the event of war
between England and the Transvaal, proclaim her neutrality.ff^
The Anglo-Portuguesa Agreement of October

1899? was,

for the most part, merely a reaffirmation of statements from
two earlier Anglo-Portuguese treaties*

These would imply Por

tuguese assistance to Great Britain without legally violating
“MaeDonell to Bertie,{? September 13, 1899, 2* 2*, I,
90, no. 115*
^ 11Salisbury to Soveral,” n* d., B. J2*, X, 92-93, enc.
in no* 117*
26

» P- 9*S enc.
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the Anglo*Oer©an agreement.

A treaty

between the two powers

signed on January 29, I6*f2, stated that
neither of the said Kings shall do or attempt any
thing against each other or in their Kingdoms, nor
shall consent nor adhere unto ss&m war counsel or
treaty in prejudice of the other.

Portugal

also agreed to prohibit the transfer of arms to the

Transvaal and

to

refrain from

a

declaration of neutrality.

When the war came a short time later
to precede
for

the

without

Great

any opposition from

Britain was able

the. outside* except

opposition of public opinion throughout Bur ope.

ffAnglo-Portuguese Secret Convention*11 October
1899 *
& * &*» if 93-*3**> no. 1X8.
The contents of this convention were
not coninunicated to the German Government until 1913*

OOmiUBJOUB
The Anglo-German Agreement of August 30, 1893, did not
succeed in its
Portugal.

avowed

purnose of providing a joint loan to

Since Lisbon waa able to recover a certain amount

of fiscal stability, it did not need assistance from the two
powers.

The agreement, however, did have definite repercus

sions on the international scene in the years limnedlately
following its conclusion and for this reason becomes impor
tant in the diplomacy of the late-nineteenth century.
England had carved out an empire in southern Africa early
in

th©

century, although she did not expand from her

claims until other C OLIO, ‘
vV ies showed their interest.
and German claims,

in

addition to the

original
Portuguese

semi-independent enclave

of the Transvaal,prevented complete control of this region,
Portugal had often faced serious native uprisings in her finan
cially burdensome African territories, but th© strong Portu
guese national pride in the empire prevented any alienation
of territory.
attitude only

Germany had

in

begun

to adopt a strong pro-colonial

the waning years of the century.

Great Britain and Germany had been

“natural allies’1 ever

since the formation of the German Empire in I87I--more so
the

signing

of the Franc o-Russian pact*

since

Great Britain feared

U3
the Kussian threat In the Mediterranean and In the Far East;
she was also Involved in numerous serious colonial clashes with
France in Africa*

Germany also publically expressed concern

over a possible war of revenge with Prance. Great Britain and
Germany together had participated in many discussions of inter
national problems, but despite occasional territorial agree
ments, there were no political ties.

Great Britain was tra

ditionally bound to a policy of non-entanglement in European
affairsf and Germany would accept nothing less than full
British partnership in the Triple Alliance.
Joseph Chamberlain had openly advocated closer ties
with Germany, perhaps even an alliance, but the German ambas
sador in bondon, acting under Instructions from Berlin, sought
to delay concluding an agreement.

If Germany could avoid th©

desired alliance with England, she could take advantage of her
valuable position and secure additional benefits— perhaps In
colonial matters— as a condition to Anglo-German concord.
The proposed Anglo-Portuguese loan fitted perfectly th©
German plan.

The Wilhelmstrasse was not particularly con

cerned about the fate of the Portuguese Empire, except where
she herself might benefit.

Perhaps this can best be demon

strated by pointing out that Germany at first demanded British
territory— '
Walfisch Bay and Blaatyr©— in addition to parts of
the Portuguese colonies.

Also, in July, 1899, the British

ministar in Lisbon was compelled to denounce the efforts of
his Gorman counterpart for attempting to force Portugal Into

lib
the Anglo-Gormaa loan*

If Portugal failed to make the loan

Germany would gain nothing, despite the sacrifice of Delagoa
Bay.
Lord Salisbury, hardly an impartial observer, said that

Germany only awed, ted the collapse of the Portuguese financial
structure in order to claim her share of colonies; Great
Britain, on the other tend, sought only to preserve the in*

tegrity of Portugal*

Although this is essentially correct,

the British were less guided by altruistic motives for main
taining the Portuguese empire than by an attempt to strengthen
the British empire*

If Portugal were to collapse, both Ger

many and Prance could claim portions of the Portuguese colonies
and threaten British colonial interests in Africa.

'While Great

Britain was also concerned with the stability of the Portuguese
monarchy— the loss of colonies could seal the doom of Carlos
X— her primary interest lay in Africa*

The British interests

were protected when Germany renounced all claims to Delagoa
Bay; she would benefit even if Portugal did not agree to the
1
loan*
With the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, Great Britain
closed the door of the Transvaal to other interested parties.
Germany, at the beginning of her negotiations with Great
Britain over the Portuguese colonies, had written off Delagoa
Bay to. Great Britain.

While th© Wilhelmstrasse attributed

this to prior British claims, the Gorman action was obviously
^ One writer says that England possibly even aided Portu
gal to secure the .French loan so as to avoid the consequences
of the Anglo-German agreement. See banger, .Diplomacy o£ JmiQXl'
m m ,
II, 529.
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part of a larger premeditated plan*

There appeared no chance

of Portugal easing her fiscal crisis without a loan; even
then the prospects of financial recovery were bleak*

Ger

many relinquished her ties in the Transvaal in the hope of

making solid gains in other areas*
A little over a year after Great Britain and Germany
signed their agreement over the Portuguese colonies. Great
Britain and the Transvaal were at war*

While one will never

know what may have happened had. the two countries not signed
the agreement, it is likely that the agreement allowed Great
Britain to pursue a more confident policy in South Africa*
The British Government had been concerned with German interests
in the Transvaal* and there was the fear that, if war broke
out, Germany would actively Intervene, as the German Emperor
had originally proposed in 1896*

Portugal would certainly

have refused German troops the right to cross Mozambique to
enter the Transvaal, and Great Britain and Portugal may have
formed a coalition against Germany*
to the continent*

Mar may also have spread

Such' a conflict mpy have developed without

the Anglo-German agreement of 1898; certainly Milner and
other British leaders were concerned over possible GermanTransvaal co-operation*

Although Germany realised that the

British control of the seas could mitigate against any overt
assistance to the Transvaal, she could apply pressure else
where.

Of course, while history in the conditional is always

interesting, it is seldom anything more*
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England and Germany began negotiations over the Portu
guese African colonics at a tine -when the two powers were
also discussing methods of reaching a general understanding.
The Portuguese question soon became of primary importance and
when completed, it briefly brought improvement in AngloGerman relations*

‘The outspoken public opinion, however, ex

cited by the passage of the first naval

law

in Germany and

the worsening of British relations with the Transvaal, pro
hibited

an

agreement*

Chamberlain erroneously thought the

agreement would bring about conditions favorable for an al
liance*

His later plea for an

November 30,

1899,

Aaglo-Gerraan

alliance on

failed to bring a warm response from

B u e t w , who wan hampered by a pro-Boer press and nubile. An
Anglo-German agreement over China in October, 1900, pro
duced no general alliance, and a last attempt aborted in 1901.
After this the gradual alignment of Ore

itain with France

and German colonial activity made a close alliance impossible.

The Anglo-German

Agreement

of

attempt to secure an understanding
one established, one aspiring.

It

August

3$, 1898, was

between two

an

colonial powers,

secured no lasting friend

ship, although it may have averted a possible Anglo-German
clash at that time.

Most assuredly it aided the British

colonial policy in South Africa? it perhaps also embarrassed
the German diplomats

who

came away empty-handed.

APPsrrarx a
THU ANGLO-G 53 KAIT AGH3S’3TJT, AUGUST 30, 18981

In view of the possibility that Portugal may require
financial assistance from some foreign Power or Powers* and
in order to obviate the International complications which
such a condition of things may produce, and to preserve her
integrity and independence^ the Undersigned , duly authorised
by their respective Sovereigns* have agreed as follows * ~
I* Whenever either the British or the German Government
Is of the opinion that it is expedient to accede to a request
for an advance of-money to Portugal on the security of the
Customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique* Angola,
and the Portuguese part of the Island of Timor, It shall
communicate that fact to the other Government, and the other
Government shall have the right to advance a sortion of the
total sum required*
In the event of the other Government signifying its In
tention to exercise this right, the two Governments shall
consult as to the terms of the two loans, and these loans
shall be Issued on the security of the Customs revenues of
Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor as near as possible
simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible
the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the Cus
toms revenues respectively assigned as their security.
The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Por
tugal as the condition of the money market and the security
of the loans permit, and shall In other respects be subject
as near as possible to similar conditions.
II. Of the Customs revenues, referred to in Article I,
those of the Province of Mozambique south of the Zambezi, and
of the part of that Province l y l ng on the left bank of the
Zambezi above its confluence; with the Shire, and those of the
portions of the Province of Angola, as hereinafter described,
shall be assigned to the British loan. The Customs revenues
of the remaining part of the Provinces of Mozambique and
Angola and the Customs revenues of Portuguese Timor shall be
assigned to the German loan.
The portion of the Province of Angola, of thieh the Cus
toms revenues shall be assigned to the British loan, is

^ f,Kr. Balfour to Lascelles,fl August 311 1898, £• t>.,
I, 71-72, enclosure in No. 90,
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comprised within the following limits# the northern frontier
shall rim from the coast along the 8th parallel of south
latitude to the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich,
thence it shall descend that degree to the 9th parallel of
latitude, and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as
the frontier o f the Congo Free State*
The southern frontier
shall start from a point of the coast 5 English miles north
of Sgito, and shall rim thence due east to the eastern fron
tier of the Province of Angola*
The western frontier shall
be the sea; the eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit
of the Province of Angola*

111* Any Delegates sent- by Great Britain or v.j*ern*any to
take note of the collection of the revenues which are the
security for their respective loans shall have only rights
of inspection, but no rights of administration, interference,
or control, so long as there is no default in the payment of
interest or sinking fund*
17* In case of default in the payment of the interest
or sinking fund of either loan, the administration of the
various custom-houses in the two provinces and in Portuguese
Timor shall be handed over by Portugal; those assigned for
the Gorman loan to Germany, those assigned for the British
loan to Great Britain*
V* It Is well understood tuat all rights, wh c tnor
British or German, acquired in the provinces affected before
the date of this Convention, shall be fully safeguarded pro
vided they are of a purely private character, and convey
neither political rights nor territorial or administrative
jurisdiction,
It Is also understood that m> influence wi 11 bo used in
the future, either by the British or the German Governments,
to obtain fresh Concessions, except In those portions of the
provinces of which the customs revenues are assigned to their
respective loans*
YI* The present Convention shall bo ratified, and the
ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon as possible•
The Convention shall come Into force immediately after the
exchange of ratifications*
In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised,
have signed the same, Done In duplicate, at London, the
30th day of August, 1898*
(L* S.)
(L* 3*}

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR*
P. HA.T2FSLDT*

SECRET COTTTUNTIOU^

Whereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
2 "Balfour to Lascelles," August 31, I898, £• j)., I,
72-73, enclosure in Ho.91*
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Convention of this doy’o date* it may unfortunate!y not be
found possible to maintain the integrity of the African pos
sessions of Portugal south :;f the Equator, as well ns those
in Timor, the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective
Sovereigns, have further agreed as follows:—
I.
Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to oppose the
intervention of any third Power in the Provinces of Mozam
bique, Angola, and in Portuguese Timor, either by way of loan
to Portugal on the security of the revenues of those provinces,
or by way of acquisition of territory, by grant, cession,
purchase, lease, or otherwise*
II* It is understood that, from the conclusion of the
Conventions of this day#s date, Great Britain will abstain
from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession,
occupation, control or exercise of political influence in or
ever those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the
Customs revenues have been assigned to Germany, and that
Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim
of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control*
or exercise of political influence, In or over those portions
of those Portuguese provinces in which the Customs revenues
have been assigned to Great Britain*
III* In case Portugal renounces her sovereign rights over
Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor, or loses these ter
ritories in any other manner, it is understood that the sub
jects of, and natives of the Protectorates of one Contracting
Party, together with their goods and ships, and also the pro
duce and the manufactures of Its dominions, possessions,
Colonies and Protectorates, shall, in such portions of the
territories comprised in the present Convention as may fall
to the other Contracting Party, participate in all the pre
rogatives, exemptions and privileges with regard to trade,
commerce, taxation and navigation which are there enjoyed
by the subjects of, and natives of the Protectorates of, the
other Contracting Party.
IV# With regard to the Vth Article of the Convention of
to—day*s date, vh ich refers to private rights of British or
German, subjects In the Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, and
Portuguese Timor, 'it is well understood between the two Govern
ments that this Article applies, among others, to the so-called
Katembe Concession, and, farther, that the Government of Groat
Britain will adopt a friendly attitude In respect to the con
firmation of this Concession by the Portuguese Government In
case such a confirmation should be applied for*
V* The present Convention shall be ratified, and the
ratifications thereof shall he exchanged as soon as possible*
The Convention shall come Into force Immediately after the
exchange of ratification.
In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised, have
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signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate, at London, the 30th Day of August,
1398.
CL* S.)
(L* S.)

ARTHUR JAHTS BALFOUR..
P. H ATZFHIX.OT•

SECRET N0TB3
In order to make clear the intention, of the loro Conventions
of this day’s date- it is further understood between the two
Governments as follows*-In the event of one of the two Governments obtaining from
the Portuguese Government before the contingency contemplated
in Article III of the Secret Convention a cession of terri
tory, or the concession of special privileges not of an oc
casional character, in those portions of the Portuguese Pro
vinces of Mozambique, Angola, or Timor, the customs revenues
of which have been assigned zo it, it is well understood
between the two Governments that such cessions of territory,
or concessions of privileges, shall not become operative until
anologous grants as near as possible of equal value have been
accorded to the other Government in those portions of the
provinces, the customs revenues of which have been assigned
to it by the present arrangement*
In case either Government applies for special privileges
of an occasional character It shall immediately inform the
other Government, and if these privileges are granted, cind if
the other Government should desire It, shall use Its influence
to obtain for the other Government similar special privileges
of an occasional character end of equal value*
And whereas, w i n g to the imperfect surveys which, alone
are at present available, the TInd Article of the Convention
of this day’s date may not exactly carry out the intentions
of the Contracting Parties, it is understood between Them
that In any case the port and the town of Ambriz shall be in
cluded in the security assigned to Germany.
In case, therefore, that the port and town of Ambriz should
be found to lie to the south of the 8th parallel of south lati
tude, the line of demarcation shall start from a. point on the
coast 5 English miles south of the port of Ambriz, and be con
tinued thence due east until it reaches the 16th degree of
longitude east of Greenwich*
From the Intersection of the line, which may be d e t e r 
mined as the line of demarcation, with the 16th degree of longi
tude aforesaid, the line shall, if necessary be extended along
3 "Balfour to lascellos," August 30, 1898, £. £>., I, ?k-75,
enclosure in No. 92*
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that degree of longitude so far south of the 9th parallel of
south latitude as will secure to Germany a strip of territory
not less than a geographical degree in width between the south
ern extremity of the Congo Free State in the region of Lunda
and the northern frontier of the portion of Angola of which
the customs revenues are assigned to Great Britain*
(L* S.)
(L* S.)

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.
P. HATZFBLOT.
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